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ABSTRACT
Previous studies have underscored the economic importance of the role of the
entrepreneur, and empirical studies testing the nature of the entrepreneur are notably lacking.
This study directly addresses this issue by examining newly gathered field data which captures
the decision making and risk behaviors for a group of high-technology entrepreneurs. Two
decision making tasks were used to elicit risk aversion measures and to test for any ‘joy of
winning’ or judgmental errors, possibly in the form of over optimistic behavior. These
elicitations were made with the use of multiple price formats and winner’s curse experiments.
62 responses were collected from subjects at the 2004 national Small Business Innovation
Research (SBIR) conference in Atlanta, March 2004. From these 62 responses a subject pool of
33 entrepreneurs and 29 non-entrepreneurs were identified. Statistical methods were employed
to assign risk aversion measures and identify any ‘joy of winning’ or judgmental errors for the
entrepreneur (treatment) group compared with the non-entrepreneur (control) group. Findings
show that entrepreneurs exhibit less risk aversion, but show no statistically meaningful
difference in judgmental errors compared to their non-entrepreneur counterparts. However, there
is evidence to support the claim that both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs exhibit a ‘joy of
winning’, and that the size of the effect is larger for entrepreneurs.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
While many previous studies have underscored the economic importance of the role of
the entrepreneur, empirical studies testing the nature of the entrepreneurs are notably lacking.
Lazear (2002; p. 1) for example states that “The entrepreneur is the single most important player
in a modern economy”, while Goeffee and Scase (1987; p.1) suggest that “They [entrepreneurs]
are seen as risk-takers and innovators…Indeed, according to many, economic recovery…is
largely dependent upon their ambitions and efforts.” This study will directly address this issue
by examining newly gathered field data which captures the decision making and risk behaviors
for a group of largely high-technology entrepreneurs.
The Oxford English Dictionary dates the word’s use back to 1828, originally used to
denote the director or manager of a public musical institution or one who ‘gets up’
entertainments. However, in 1852 the semantic definition began to include one who undertakes
an enterprise; one who owns and manages a business; a person who takes the risk of profit or
loss. This study will use the last definition.
Perhaps the easiest type of entrepreneur to identify is the individual who is self-employed
- the initial owner and operator of a firm. There is recent survey evidence that suggests, in
industrialized countries, many individuals who are currently employed in another firm would
actually prefer to be self-employed. Although hardly conclusive, this evidence is suggestive that
there may be restrictions imposed on the supply of entrepreneurs. For example in the
International Social Survey Programme – Work Orientations II Survey of 1997, respondents
from 26 countries were asked: “Suppose you were working and could choose between different
kinds of jobs. Which of the following would you personally choose? I would choose (i) being
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an employee, (ii) being self-employed, (iii) Can’t choose.” Large numbers of survey participants
answered (ii), stating that they would prefer to be self-employed. Examining choices by
country, 61.8 percent of the US respondents indicated their preference for self-employment over
working in another firm, in contrast to 39.4 percent from Great Britain and 47.7 percent for
Germany. In reality however, only about 15 percent of the U.S. and Great Britain’s workforces,
and 10 percent of Germany‘s workforce are actually self employed.1 These differences raise an
interesting question: Why don’t more of these individuals, desirous to be self-employed, actually
become self-employed?
In this study I explore possible answers to this question using established methodologies
from the social sciences and include findings from the disciplines of psychology, economics, and
management. I will also present new findings on entrepreneurial risk preferences and optimism
to better characterize and define the entrepreneur; where risk is defined as the chance that is
accepted in economic enterprise and considered the source of (an entrepreneur’s) profit. Using
lottery choice and biding experiments performed on entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs in the
field, rather than college students in the lab, my study attempts a direct elicitation of risk
aversion and judgmental bias stemming from optimism for the entrepreneur. This study tries to
provide a clearer picture as to why certain individuals self-select into the role of an entrepreneur
while others do not.
The hypotheses tested in this study are: (i) entrepreneurs are less risk averse than nonentrepreneurs; (ii) entrepreneurs will experience a ‘joy of winning’ compared to non-

1

http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/issp/codebooks/s3090cdb.pdf German statistics are obtained using a weighted
average of the aggregates given for D-W and D-E.
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entrepreneurs; and (iii) entrepreneurs will suffer from judgmental bias, possibly in the form of
over-optimism, more than non-entrepreneurs.
The organization of the thesis is as follows: Chapter II, the literature review, explores the
self-employment choice of individuals and motivates the use of experimental methods; Chapter
III, describes the experimental design and specific methodology used for measuring risk aversion
and optimism; Chapter IV, presents empirical results; and finally, Chapter V provides
conclusions of the study and identifies important areas for future research.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Social Science Approach to Entrepreneurs
Social science researchers have attempted to characterize and define what makes an
entrepreneur by interviewing individuals that self-selected into becoming an entrepreneur and
look for causal relationships in their socio-demographic profile that could account for this.
Davidsson’s Researching Entrepreneurship (2004; p.37) contains a chart of possible
determinants of entrepreneurship gathered from “reading a large number of empirically based
studies.” Among those cited were education level, need for achievement (nAch), taxes, risk
taking, firm size, business cycle stage, firm age, age, sex, shoe size, business education, locus-ofcontrol, networking, optimism, location, management experience, industry growth rate, labor
market legislation, industry structure, role models, industry experience, and regional
characteristics, but even this is only a partial list of the actual attributes which characterize and
define the entrepreneur.
It is beyond the scope of this study to provide a background into every determinant of
entrepreneurship studied thus far; however, limited attention will given to those sociodemographic variables that are mentioned in much of the current research. These variables
include the existence of a parent or close relative entrepreneur (Jacobowitz & Vidler, 1982;
Scherer, Brodzinski & Wiebe, 1991; Hisrich, 1990), educational attainment (Evans & Leighton,
1989; Brockhaus, 1982; Hisrich, 1990), locus of control (Rotter, 1966, Jacobowitz & Vidler,
1982) and optimism (de Meza & Southey, 1996; Evans & Leighton, 1989).
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Existence of parent entrepreneur
Jacobowitz and Vidler (1982) administered a questionnaire which focused on educational
and social background, perceived satisfaction, and personality attributes of 430 small business
owners in central New Jersey and eastern Pennsylvania. These entrepreneurs shared certain
characteristics, despite their particular industry of operation. Most (72 percent) came from
homes where their parents or close relatives either owned a small business or were independent
professionals. According to the authors (p.254) the rationale was that “…such a background
created a climate where entrepreneurial qualities were established as standards and gave tacit
approval to similar behaviors displayed by the entrepreneurs in their early years. The role
models they were exposed to in their youth set the tone for their attachment to entrepreneurial
values and attitudes.” In addition, Hisrich (1990; p.211) states, “To see someone else do
something and succeed makes it easier to picture oneself doing a similar, and of course, better,
activity.” One could reason this behavior would be particularly likely in a household where a
close family member is an entrepreneur. These studies suggest that the existence of a parent or
close relative entrepreneur would increase the chances of an individual becoming an
entrepreneur; however these studies do not examine how risk aversion or optimism might be
passed on to family members.

Educational Attainment
Evans and Leighton (1989) examined determinants of earnings for self-employed
individuals using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men for 1966-1981 and
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the Current Population Surveys for 1968-1987. Using these data sets, they ran regression
analyses for the role of education using probit and log-earnings functions. The probit regressions
estimated the probability that an individual would be self-employed for the year 1981. Results
indicated that, ceteris paribus, the probability of being self employed increased by 4.7 percent
per additional year of education. The log-earnings regression estimated wage differences (as a
percentage) between self-employed individuals and wage workers. The estimations revealed
that, ceteris paribus, returns per additional year of education were higher for self-employed
individuals, averaging 10.3 percent per year, compared with wage workers average of 7.1
percent per year.2 These studies suggest that the more education an individual has, the greater
the likelihood that individual will be self-employed, and that they will be self-employed at a
higher wage then they could get as a wage earning worker. One could reason that an individual
with this information would realize that their expected utility under self-employment would
exceed their expected utility as a wage worker; however, this statement would assume that all
individuals display similar risk aversion preferences.
Additionally, Hisrich (1990; p.212) states “Both male and female entrepreneurs have
cited educational needs in the areas of finance, planning, marketing (particularly distribution),
and management.” It is plausible to think that each additional year of education an individual
acquires would lead to an increased chance of exposure to core business functions, such as those
cited by Hisrich. With exposure to these functions an individual would presumably have a
foundation of principles to draw from when starting a business, thus creating a sense of certainty

2

Evans and Leighton (p.530) reports results that are statistically significant even after controlling for individuals in
professional occupations.
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when putting these principles into practice. Indeed, education of core business functions would
allow individuals to cope with problems as they arise and allow for the correction of deficiencies
before it would have put them out of business.

Locus of control
Much of the current literatures on entrepreneurs refer to a psychological assessment test,
designed by Julian Rotter (1966), known as locus of control (LOC). LOC provides a measure of
the extent to which an individual believes the occurrence of good or bad circumstances in their
life is conditional on their own behavior. This measure is defined using Rotter’s InternalExternal (I-E) scale. Individuals are classified along a continuum from 0 (very internal) to 23
(very external): ‘Internals’ view positive or negative events as being related to one's own actions
and thereby under one's own personal control; conversely, ‘externals’ view positive or negative
events as being unrelated to one's own behavior in certain situations and thereby beyond personal
control.
‘Internals’ are viewed as being apt to be more self-reliant, independent, wanting greater
autonomy, and hold a view that change in the world comes from within and is not left to destiny
or fate; these qualities would presumably be important to an entrepreneur. ‘Externals’ are
characterized as seeing happenings in life controlled by luck, chance, or powerful others. The
general population falls somewhere between these two extremes; however, one would expect
entrepreneurs self-selecting from the internal side of the I-E continuum.
For example, Shapero (1975; p.84) administered the I-E exam to 101 Texan and 34
Italian entrepreneurs and reported I-E scores averaging 6.58, making these entrepreneurs ‘more
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internal’ than non-entrepreneurial individuals.3 Shapero (p.84) goes on to state “Indeed, to my
knowledge, only Peace Corps volunteers have come out more internal [than entrepreneurs]”.4
Another study, by Pandey & Tewary (1979) surveyed individuals in India wanting to obtain
start-up capital from a financial firm. Those selected to receive the financing had I-E scores
averaging 7.22 while those rejected had scores averaging 9.31, with the difference between these
scores being statistically significant at the 5 percent level, implying that those chosen for the start
up capital were ‘more internal’ then those not selected. Here it is important to note the
limitations of the I-E scale, because the I-E scale does not have clear demarcations stating
something to the effect “you received a score of 12, you are ‘more internal’; welcome to the
wonderful world of self-reliance, independence and autonomy. Or, you received a score of 20
making you ‘more external’; welcome to a world controlled by luck, chance, or powerful
others.” In fact there is a continuum between the extremes of ‘very external’ and ‘very internal’.
Although both studies reported average I-E scores for their respective entrepreneurs as
‘internals’, it is more precise to state they categorized their entrepreneur group as ‘more internal’
then their counterparts. These studies imply that, on average, ‘more-internal’ individuals (those
with I-E scores closer to the ‘very internal’ side of the continuum) will self-select into
entrepreneurship more so then ‘more external’ individuals.

3

The authors do not define an entrepreneur for their study; however, they go on to state (p.84) “Italians tend to view
the small business as parvenu…” possibly alluding to the sampling of small business owners. Likewise for the
Americans in the study, with over 99 percent of businesses in American defined as small (less then 500 employees),
one could be fairly confident that these were small business entrepreneurs as well.
4
This statement makes sense, in that Peace Corps volunteers would need to feel that their individual actions could
change the world about them, especially in a foreign country where their actions would have to speak louder then
their non-native words.
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As Evans & Leighton (1989; p.521) state “As predicted by one of the leading
psychological theories, men who believe their performance depends largely on their own actions
– that is, have an internal locus of control as measured by a psychological test known as the
Rotter Scale – have a greater propensity to start a business.” and (p.532) “Self-employed workers
at a point in time tend to have a more internal locus of control…and individuals with a more
internal locus of control are more likely to enter self-employment…”
The statements and empirical work presented above illustrate how the I-E scale’s
measure of LOC could lead to a type of risk profiling of individuals and thereby a proxy measure
for individual’s actual level of risk aversion. That is, on average, the ‘more internal’ an
individual is at a certain point in time, the more likely that person will go into self-employment,
thus the I-E scale could be measuring, along with other variables, the degree to which an
individual is risk averse. For example, an individual that scores lower on the I-E scale (more
internal) could be someone who is also more willing to accept risk then someone who scored
higher (more external). This statement could be captured by the ‘internal’ individual’s
perception that they hold a certain amount of control over their environment and have the
strength within themselves to affect outcomes, thus leading them to taking on more risk then
their counterparts would.

Optimism
There is a generally held view that entrepreneurs, as the founders of small business, are
overly optimistic individuals compared with the rest of the population. In fact this reasoning has
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been used to explain why a large number of new start-up businesses fail.5 Starting a new
business would generally require an individual with a tendency to take a favorable view of
circumstances or prospects -an optimist. Shapero (1975; p.85) puts it another way “In order to
see starting a company as a credible act, it may also be necessary to be blind to some of the
risks.” Similarly, de Meza and Southey (1996; p.376) say “…it is from the most over optimistic
segment of the population that entrepreneurs will select themselves.”
There are some parallels that can be drawn between LOC and optimism as captured by de
Meza and Southey (1996; p. 376) “Being an entrepreneur is very much to be in control. The
probability of success will, to a large degree, depend on the entrepreneur’s abilities. Many of
those starting new businesses will have little evidence upon which to base their beliefs about the
likelihood of failure or success. The situation would be ripe for unrealistic optimism,
particularly with regard to the entrepreneur’s perceived abilities.” Here the parallel is drawn
between “the entrepreneurs perceived abilities” and its implicit measure by LOC.
Otherwise stated, at a point in time ‘internals’ possess a belief that change in the world
comes from within; therefore, the entrepreneurial field is thought to have a predisposition for
individuals with a ‘more-internal’ LOC and be overly optimistic in their abilities to the point of
judgmental bias. The bias becoming more severe for an optimist with an internal LOC, an
individual with heightened perceived abilities. Judgmental error would bias the individual’s own
ability to distinguish between risks inherent in doing business and risks that can be diminished

5

Using data from 1989 through 1998 The US Census Bureau’s Business Information Tracking Series (BITS) Headd
(2003; p.59) reports that only half (49.6 percent) of new firms started in the United States were still in operation
after 4 years and only 40 percent were still open after 6 years.
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with the entrepreneur’s own abilities; possibly causing them to take on higher levels of risk
compared to other sub-sets of the general population.
In sum, the entrepreneurial literature has largely accounted for risk through sociodemographic and psychological proxies. However while these parameters provide a good
foundation, the analytical construct of an entrepreneur is clearly not complete. I propose that a
natural progression in the study of entrepreneurs is to measure risk preferences and judgmental
errors directly using salient methods to provide testable hypotheses in order to systematically
evaluate the existing theories on entrepreneurial behavior. The next subsection provides pertinent
literature currently used for testing risk aversion and optimism using experimental economics.

Experimental Methodologies to Eliciting Responses

Risk Aversion
How can we assign individuals a measure of risk aversion? The psychology literature has
partially addressed this question by testing for causal links between individuals that have selfselected into entrepreneurial roles and their socio-demographic make-up. However, these studies
fail to test whether entrepreneurs are inherently different in their degree of risk aversion than the
general population. This is where Expected Utility (EU) theory and Multiple Price List (MPL)
approaches combine to provide a test of differences in risk aversion between two groups.
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Holt and Laury (2002) (HL) used a menu of paired lottery choices, i.e. MPL, similar to
Binswanger (1980),6 but added additional rounds where the choices were hypothetical. Their
experiment presented subjects with a choice between two lotteries, defined as A or B, where the
crossover point between these two lotteries, the ‘safe’ and the ‘high-risk’ lottery, was used to
infer the degree of risk aversion. Table 1 illustrates the basic payoff matrix presented to subjects.
The first row shows that lottery A offered a 10 percent chance of receiving $2 and a 90 percent
chance of receiving $1.60. The expected value of this lottery, EVA, is shown as $1.64; however,
the EV columns were not shown to subjects. Similarly, lottery B in the first row has chances of
payoffs of $3.85 and $0.10, for an expected value of $0.48. These parameters result in a
difference between the expected values, in this case $1.17. As one proceeds down the payoff
matrix, the expected value of both lotteries increases; with the expected value of lottery B
becoming greater than the expected value of lottery A after the fourth decision row.
For each row the subject chooses decision A or B, with one row later being selected at
random for payout to that subject. The logic behind this method is that only extremely riskloving subjects would choose lottery B in the first row, and only extremely risk-averse subjects
would choose lottery A in the second last row. The last decision row is a test that the subjects
were awake and understood the instructions; after all, with no risk involved, more is always
better! These parameters imply that a risk-neutral subject would switch from decision A to B

6

Binswanger conducted a field experiment with 330 farmers in rural India. The lotteries were played 7 or 8 times
over 6 weeks in different farming villages. A coin toss was used to determine the outcome and had real payoffs that
were fairly high relative to the farmers' monthly incomes. Subjects were asked to choose between 7 lottery choices
with the riskier alternatives being an average-preserving spreads of the less risky ones; that is, the lottery choices
had the same expected value, but a higher variance of payoffs. Results found that as payoffs rose (1/100; 1/10; 1;
and 10) nearly 80 percent of the subjects displayed moderate-risk aversion, while risk-neutral and risk-loving
behavior almost disappear.
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when the EVB becomes greater than EVA; therefore, a risk-neutral subject should choose A for
the first four rows and B thereafter, denoted by the dashed line in Table 1.7
At the heart of the experiment HL wanted to test whether a scaling up of payouts, by a
constant k would change the amount of risk aversion displayed by the subjects. They set up the
experiment with four tasks which followed this order: 1x low-real “baseline” payout (as found in
Table 1); 20x high-hypothetical payout; 20x, 50x, or 90x high-real payouts; and finally, a “return
to baseline” 1x low-real payout. To control for wealth effects between tasks one and three the
subjects were required to initial a statement that said they would forego their previous earnings
in order to participate in the higher-real lottery. A statement was also made between task one
and two that clarified to the participants that the hypothetical winnings would not be paid out.8
The authors then used these data to test the predictive power of constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) over increasing payout schemes blown up by a constant k and its affects on the
average number of safe choices made by the subjects. HL (p.1646) chose to use CRRA as a
benchmark because “the literature on auctions commonly assumes constant relative risk aversion
for its computational convenience and its implications for bid function linearity.” However, they
do not assume that individuals exhibit CRRA, but use the base calculations of CRRA as the basis
for their null hypothesis – Does CRRA provide an adequate measure to explain risk aversion
over a large payout range from several dollars to several hundred dollars?

7

A nice overview of MPL formats and their advantages and disadvantages can be found in Andersen, Harrison, Lau
and Rutström (2004).
8
Holt and Laury (p.6) stated that “Nobody declined to participate, so there is no selection bias.” In other words, all
subjects proceed through all four tasks of the experiment. This step would not have been useful between the highreal payout of task three and the “return to baseline” task of four. We would expect no one to continue if required to
give up their higher earnings to play a lower valued game.
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HL used the number of safe lottery choices given by the subjects to infer a range of
relative risk aversion. The logic is that when subjects switch between the ‘safe’ and ‘riskier’
lotteries they implicitly select an interval of relative risk aversion. Table 2 in Appendix B has a
break down of these intervals and the classification associated for each. For example, someone
that chooses four ‘safe’ choices of Option A and then switches to the ‘riskier’ Option B
thereafter would be classified as ‘risk neutral’ with implied range of relative risk aversion -0.15 <
r < 0.15. The variable r is defined as the CRRA coefficient, and is what the subject is implicitly
defining when switching between the ‘safe’ and ‘riskier’ lotteries. When the switch between the
two lotteries takes place the subject is stating that somewhere in that interval the expected utility
of the ‘safe’ Option A is equal to the expected utility of the ‘riskier’ Option B. Once this
equality is passed the ‘riskier’ Option B has greater expected utility from that point on. These
bounds are calculated using the CRRA function, defined as U(x) = x1-r/(1-r), along with the
probabilities and payouts for the HL ‘baseline’ treatment given in Table 1.9
Table 3 shows the setup needed to calculate the lower bound for the ‘risk neutral’ subject
(-0.15). Notice that the EUsafe (expected utility for the ‘safe’ lottery) column is the expected
utility derived from the ‘safe’ payoffs along with their associated probabilities. The EUsafe for
four ‘safe’ choices equals:
1− r
⎞(1 − .4 )
⎞⎟(.4) + ⎛⎜ $1.601− r
EUsafe = ⎛⎜ $2
(1 − r ) ⎠
(1 − r ) ⎟⎠
⎝
⎝

It is equal to the safe-high-payoff to the (1-r) power, divided by (1-r) all multiplied by the
probability of the event occurring plus the safe-low-payoff to the (1-r) power, divided by (1-r) all

9

The utility of x, U(x), is defined under the von Neumann-Morganstien expected utility theory, the utility that is
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multiplied by 1 minus the probability of that event occurring. This equals EUsafe of 1.76.
Duplicating this process using the ‘riskier’ lottery with payouts of $3.85 and $0.10 produces
EUrisk (expected utility for the ‘riskier’ lottery) equal to 1.60. The EUdiff (difference between
EUsafe and EUrisk) is 0.16. Up to this point we did not specify r (the middle table of table 4).
The objective is to get the EUdiff equal to zero by allowing r to vary until the argument is
satisfied. This is accomplished with the ‘Goal Seek’ function in Excel. It ‘forces’ the EUdiff to
zero by finding a value of r that satisfies the argument, r equal to -0.1426 satisfies this. HL
reports this as -0.15. This method can be extended to show all intervals.
HL used these implied intervals to classify all of their treatments. They found that CRRA
provided a useful measure of risk aversion for lower payouts; however, it predicted absurd
amounts of risk aversion in high stake payouts. They now needed a utility function that would
be consistent with the observed subject behavior over a wide range of payoff stakes. Their
subject data showed that higher numbers of ‘safe choices’, Option A, were made for the real
high-payoff tasks compared with the real low-payoff task. Stated otherwise, the subjects
exhibited higher degrees of risk-aversion for the real high-payoff treatments more than the real
low-payoff and CRRA does not model these changes accordingly. A new function was needed
that could model these changes. The model proposed was:
…we introduce a noise parameter, µ, that captures the insensitivity of choice probabilities to
payoffs via the probabilistic choice rule:
1

Pr(chooseOptionA) =

UAµ
1

1

U A µ +UB µ ,

derived from the prize in the experiment.
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where the denominator simply ensures that the probabilities of each choice sum to one. Notice that the
choice probabilities converge to one-half as µ becomes large, and it is straight forward to show that the
probability of choosing the option with the higher expected payoff goes to 1 as µ goes to 0…
The next step is to introduce a functional form that permits the type of increasing relative risk
aversion seen in our data, but avoids the absurd predictions of the constant absolute risk aversion model.
This can be done with a hybrid “power-expo” function (Saha, 1993) that includes constant relative risk
aversion and constant absolute risk aversion as special cases:

U ( x) =

1 − exp(−αx 1− r )

α

,

which has been normalized to ensure that utility becomes linear in x in the limit as α goes to 0. It is
straightforward to show that the Arrow-Pratt index of relative risk aversion is:

− u '' ( x ) x
= r + α (1 − r ) x1− r
'
u ( x)
which reduces to constant relative risk aversion of r when α = 0 , and to constant absolute risk aversion of
α when r = 0. For intermediate cases (both parameters positive), the utility function exhibits increasing
relative risk aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion (Abdellaoui, Barrios, and Wakker, 2000).

HL used the proportion of safe choices in each of the ten decisions for the four realpayoff treatments to obtain maximum-likelihood parameter estimates for the “power-expo”
utility function. Once the parameter estimates were obtained they were used to plot theoretical
predictions for the four real treatments and modeled most of the aggregate data averages closely.
The three parameter model granted the flexibility to predict risk aversion needed to explain
behavior in both the low and high-stake treatments. The authors state (p.1653) “…this three
parameter model does a remarkable job of predicting behavior over a payoff range from several
dollars to several hundred dollars.”
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Joy of Winning and Optimism
How can we empirically test an individual’s optimism? One possible answer lies in a
concept known as the winner’s curse, which is illustrated with an example from Richard Thaler’s
(1988; p.191) article Anomalies: The Winner’s Curse:
Next time that you find yourself a little short of cash for lunch, try the following experiment in
your class. Take a jar and fill it with coins, noting the total value of the coins. Now auction off the jar to
your class (offering to pay the winning bidder in bills to control for penny aversion). Chances are very
high that the following results will be obtained: (1) the average bid will be significantly less than the value
of the coins (bidders are risk averse); (2) the winning bid will exceed the value of the jar. Therefore, you
will have money for lunch, and your students will have learned first-hand about the “winner’s curse”.

The winner’s curse can form in one of two ways: (i) the winning bid is greater than the
total value of the coins, resulting in a loss for the buyer; or (ii) the total value of the coins is less
than the buyer’s estimate and thus has a disappointing result. Both scenarios require the winner
to be optimistic about their bid and result in regret for the winner.10 The unhappiness stems from
the optimistic bidder’s initial overestimation of the expected value of the coins in the jar
compared to the actual amount. Thus when informed about their actual winnings, either form of
the winner’s curse would have occurred.
Experimental evidence of the winner’s curse has been provided by a study conducted by
Samuelson and Bazerman (1983). They administered a test, similar to the example provided
above, to 12 classes of M.B.A students at Boston College with 4 rounds of auctions in each class
for a total of 48 auctions. Each round had a jar with contents valued at $8, not known to the
students, and in every round the students would place a sealed bid on that jar. No feedback was
provided to the students between rounds. The 48 auctions revealed a mean estimate for the jars
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of $5.13 - a downward bias relative to the true $8 value. However, the mean winning bid was
$10.01 which produced an average loss of $2.01 to the winner, thus providing evidence of the
winner’s curse in this laboratory setting.
Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) expanded their research of the winner’s curse with
‘takeover’ or ‘buy a firm’ experiments. Their experimental design assigned subjects to the role
of a corporate raider seeking 100 percent control of another firm. A takeover of the firm would
occur through a complete purchase of the firm’s shares in the market; however, the exact value
of the firm’s stock, v, was not known. After the establishment of the subject’s role, the
instructions gave two additional pieces of information: (i) v under current ownership is uniformly
distributed between $0 and $100 dollars per share; (ii) under new ownership the acquired firm
would be valued 50 percent higher than under current ownership through better management.11
It was left to the corporate raider to decide a price per share to place a bid, B, for ownership of
the firm; with a sale happening only if the bid was greater than or equal to the value of the stock,
or B ≥ v .
The authors chose the parameter v to be uniformly distributed between $0 and $100 per
share to make sure all positive bids generated expected losses, thus allowing for an extreme case
of the winner’s curse to form. Under this setting the authors could test two competing
hypotheses about subject bidding behavior: normative and naïve. They argued that not revealing
the actual value of the firm, instead giving only an interval, would affect different subjects
bidding behavior in different ways. The logic being that if an individual believes that their bid

10
11

This statement does not take into account the individuals risk preference.
Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) experiment, version 3, page 109.
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will result in a successful acquisition of the firm, then this event should signal to the bidder that
they probably overestimated the value of the firm in comparison to its’ actual market value. The
normative, or rational, bidder would account for this information, revise their estimate of the
firm’s market value, and lower their bid accordingly. The naïve bidder would fail to account for
this information, leaving their estimate of the firm’s market value, and subsequently their bid
unchanged.
In the ‘buy a firm’ example, the true value of the firm to be acquired is not known; only
the interval is known. Here the rational bidder corrects for the unknown true value of the firm by
basing their expected value of an acquisition on the condition that their bid, B, is accepted. If B
is accepted it would signal that the expected value of the company would be valued at B/2;
therefore, the rational bidder will form an expectation of the value of an acquisition that is 150
percent of the expected value of the company less the bid. In contrast, a naive bidder, ignoring
the information asymmetry, would condition their bid on the expected v only, thus leading the
naïve bidder to believe the expected value of the firm to be 150 percent the expected value of the
firm, less the bid. To recap: a naïve bidder would condition their bid on an expected v, while the
rational bidder would base their expected value of the firm conditioned on their bid being
accepted. Mathematically this is shown for a rational and naïve bid, respectively:

E[V ] = (1.5 ∗ B 2) − B
Equation 1: Rational Bid Function
E[V ] = (1.5 ∗ v ) − B

Equation 2: Naive Bid Function
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Equation (2) states that a naïve corporate raider will place an expected value of an
acquisition equal to 150 percent of the expected value under current ownership less the bid.
Equation (1) corrects for the asymmetric information and has the rational corporate raider basing
their expected value of an acquisition conditioned on the bid, B, being accepted. If B is accepted
then the expected value of the company would be worth B/2; therefore, the rational bidder will
place an expected value of an acquisition equal to 150 percent of the expected value of the
company less the bid. Expanding equation (1) shows that the expected value is only (3/4)B;
clearly (3/4)B is less than B and the rational bidder’s optimal bidding strategy would be not to
bid at all under these parameters.
Their study examined bidding patterns in the lab with parameters designed to form an
extreme form of the winner’s curse. The experiment was run with 595 MBA students at the
University of Boston under hypothetical and monetary reward conditions. In either case the
rational optimal bidding strategy would have been a bid of zero to avoid losses; however, in both
treatments (real and hypothetical) over 90 percent of the subjects made positive bids with the
majority in the range between $50 and $75, thus rejecting rational bidding behavior.12
Samuelson and Bazerman (p.117) state that “there is substantial evidence that many subjects
looked for mutually profitable opportunities based on a naïve model of negotiator behavior,
leading most of them to surprising losses.”

12

Samuelson and Bazerman state (p.114) that “the bulk of the experiments did not employ monetary payoffs…
[however] it was important to ensure that subjects had sufficient incentives to make serious decisions. To test
subject incentives, a subsample of students participated in Version 3 of the exercise where monetary payoffs were at
stake. Subject behavior under this experimental treatment was found to be statistically indistinguishable from
behavior in the experiments without monetary payoffs.”
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If there is a winner’s curse, then is there a loser’s curse as well? Interestingly enough
there is, and it is the exact opposite of the winner’s curse. Holt and Sherman (1994)
hypothesized that the winner’s curse could be the product of two separate states: (i) a bidder is
naïve and ignores information asymmetry; (ii) the subject experiences a pure joy of winning,
which increases the possibility that overbidding, is due to a ‘utility of winning’. Both states
produce overbidding, a subsequent loss, and the winner’s curse, so the authors designed a way to
test for these distinct causes of the winner’s curse.
Following the works of Bazerman (1984) and Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), Holt and
Sherman (1994) (HS) designed a modified takeover experiment with varying parameters to allow
for three treatments in the game: (i) the winner’s curse, producing overbidding; (ii) a situation in
which the ‘joy of winning’ is overshadowed, the loser’s curse, producing underbidding; (iii)
where the winner’s curse equals the loser’s curse, a “no curse state”. They speculated that if in
the “no curse state” there was a residual tendency to overbid, it could provide evidence of a ‘joy
of winning’. They proposed the model:
Suppose the value of a firm to its current owner is v, where v is uniformly distributed in the range
from X to X+R. When a bid, B, is greater than v and so is accepted, the value to the bidder is Mv, where M
> 1. The expected gain to a bidder will be the value of the item less the amount bid for it, all times the
probability of having the bid accepted. It is easy to see that (B-X)/R represents the probability of having a
bid B accepted, since it is the probability that v is less than B. The optimal bid will take into account the
current owner’s decision rule in order to use the added information that would be revealed by the fact of
winning. If the bidder wins, for instance, the value of the firm to the current owner cannot exceed B.
Indeed, its expected value must be X + ( B − X ) / 2 , which is the average value that would lie between X
and B if bid B were accepted. For a risk-neutral bidder, the optimal bid maximizes the integral of
Mv − B over the interval from v = X to v = B . It is straightforward to express this expected-earnings
integral as the product of the acceptance probability and the expected earnings conditional on acceptance,
as shown in equation (1a):

⎛B−X
⎜
⎝ R

⎤
B− X ⎞
⎞⎡ ⎛
⎟ − B⎥
⎟⎢M ⎜ X +
2 ⎠
⎠⎣ ⎝
⎦

Equation 1a: Rational Objective Function

21

⎛B−X
⎜
⎝ R

⎤
R⎞
⎞⎡ ⎛
⎟⎢M ⎜ X + ⎟ − B⎥
2⎠
⎠⎣ ⎝
⎦

Equation 1b: Naïve Objective Function
Suppose that a naïve bidder, in contrast, does not condition the value of a purchase on the level of
the accepted bid but, rather, assumes that the value is M ( X + R / 2) , because X + R / 2 is the expected
value of v. This yields the naïve objective in equation (1b). Both objectives are concave in the choice
variable B. Differentiation of the alternative objective in (1a) and (1b) with respects to B yields alternative
first-order conditions for rational and naïve bidding:

B− X ⎞
M
⎛
M⎜X +
− (B − X ) = 0
⎟ − B + (B − X )
2 ⎠
2
⎝
Equation 2a: FOC for Rational Objective Function

R⎞
⎛
M ⎜ X + ⎟ − B + * * * − (B − X ) = 0
2⎠
⎝
Equation 2b: FOC for Naive Objective Function
where the “ ∗ ∗ ∗ ” indicates a missing term to be discussed below. The intuition behind the
winner’s and loser’s curse can be found from a comparison of these two conditions. By the concavity of
the objective functions in B, any factor that makes the left side of the first-order condition in (2) larger will
result in higher bids, and visa versa.
First, note that it is never optimal to bid above the range of seller values, because a bid of
X + R will always be accepted. Since B − X ≤ R , the first term on the left side of (2) is lower for
rational bidding. This is the winner’s curse effect; the far left-hand terms in (2) are the buyer expected
values, conditional on a bid’s acceptance, and the lower conditional valuation for the rational bidder will
lead to lower bids.
Next consider the term B − X M 2 , which is present in (2a), but is missing from (2b), where
∗
∗
∗
appears. This term represents the rational observation that B is the upper limit of seller values
the
that will result in a purchase, so increasing the bid by 1 at the margin will raise the expected seller value of
a purchased unit by ½, which is multiplied by M to get the buyer value. In the rational-bidding condition in
(2a) this product of ½ and M is multiplied by ( B − X ) , which is proportional to the probability of making
a purchase. The result is a positive term that tends to raise the rational bid by (2a), as compared with the
naïve bid. The failure of a naïve bidder to raise B in this manner generates the loser’s curse effect.
The rational and naïve bids, denoted by BR and BN, respectively, are obtained directly from (2):

(

⎛ 1
BR = ⎜
⎝2−M

)

⎞
⎟X
⎠

Equation 3a: Rational Bid Function

⎛ M + 1⎞
⎛M ⎞
BN = ⎜
⎟ X + ⎜ ⎟ R.
⎝ 2 ⎠
⎝ 4 ⎠
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Equation 3b: Naive Bid Function
The bidding functions in (3) are linear and provide a basis for several null hypotheses. In
particular, if X and R are varied across several treatments, the coefficient for R in a linear bid regression
should be zero for a rational bidder and should be positive for a naïve bidder.

The authors then used the bid function in equation (3) in Holt and Sherman (1994) to
obtain parameters that allowed for the 3 treatments, shown in Table 4, to form these predictions:
a. B R p B N ; the winner’s curse
b. B R = B N ; no curse
c. B R f B N ; the loser’s curse
It is worth noting a few things about these parameters. The parameters X, R, and M were first
chosen to keep expected payout under rational bidding constant and were then later doubled.
The second step was to diminish erratic behavior that may occur in a laboratory setting from too
low a payout, e.g. the subjects would not take the task seriously because there would be no
reward for doing so. For example, with parameters X at 1.5, R at 4.5, and M at 1.5, the winner’s
curse treatment, would yield a rational bid of $3. Plugging the $3 bid into equation (1a) implies
an expected gain of $0.125; this payout was later doubled to $0.25. Next, the expected gain from
a naïve bid was $0.04 lower in the winner’s and loser’s curses compared to the no curse
treatment. The authors state that the symmetry in deviation across both curses is desirable in
order to diminish any bias associated with deviations in behavior because of cost of departures
that would favor one curse over the other. Last, the expected gain from naïve bidding was also
doubled, but calculated in a different manner. In order to compare the competing hypotheses, it
was necessary to find the rational interpretation of using a naïve bid; therefore expected gains
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from naïve bids are obtained from plugging the naive bids into equation (1a) as well, the
expected profit formula for the rational model. This step shows the expected gain of a naïve bid
from a rational perspective.
The modified takeover experiment was administered to 50 undergraduate students at the
University of Virginia. Each subject was assigned the role of a bidder, with initial wealth set to
$6, $8, or $12, and was assigned one of two treatment conditions; either a no-curse/winner’s
curse/loser’s curse treatment or no-curse/loser’s curse/winner’s curse treatment.13 They were
told to place a bid for each curse in a treatment and repeat the experiment 10 times for a total of
30 bids.
Their findings indicate that the students fall victim to the loser’s curse as predicted by the
naïve-bidding rule. Also, the data for the no curse treatment were close to predicted rational and
naïve bids, indicating no strong evidence for a ‘utility of winning’ that would bias bids upwards.

13

Holt and Sherman used the no-curse treatment first in both tasks. Ordering the curses in this manner permits
testing of order effects for the winner’s and loser’s curses, but not in the ‘no curse’ treatment. Harrison, Johnson,
McInnes, and Rutström (2004) point out that not varying the order of the treatments can confound results, and
possibly lead to an incorrect interpretation of findings if not correctly accounted for.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

Testing for Risk Aversion
Following the design of Holt and Laury (2002) (HL) I designed a menu of paired lottery
choices to test whether entrepreneurs are inherently different in their degree of risk aversion than
a control group comprised of salaried employees.
The design mimics HL and uses a 10x real-payoff version of their “baseline” treatment.
This allows for consistency with the current literature and preserves the CRRA intervals used for
demarcation of risk classes. However, I add on to the design in the following ways: (i) a oneshot game is played, instead of subjects facing a sequence of MPL tasks; (ii) subjects were
presented with either the 10x real-payoff in a table using the same order as the HL study, ‘top to
bottom’, or in an alternate order, ‘bottom to top’; and (iii) I used entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurial professionals instead of students.
The one-shot game allowed for a ‘snap-shot’ of a subject’s risk aversion. This method
did not allow for subject learning as the HL study had done over the four tasks with different
payouts to find if the scaling of a constant k in lottery payouts affected risk aversion; this was
never my intention. The next modification was based on findings by Harrison, Johnson,
McInnes, and Rutström (2004), who argue that the HL study was confounded by a simple order
effect and that their main conclusions might therefore be accounted for by simply varying the
order of the instrument. Following this finding I created two MPL formats that were 10x
treatments of HL’s ‘baseline’ treatment, only differing in the order of presentation to the
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subject.14 Version X, ‘top to bottom’, displayed the associated probabilities concurrent with a
10x payout of HL, where Decision Row 1 indicated Option A as having a 10 percent chance of
receiving $20 and a 90 percent chance of receiving $16.00. Table 5 in Appendix B shows the
expected value of this lottery, EVA, as $16.40; as in the HL study, the EV columns were not
given to subjects. Similarly, lottery B in the first row has chances of payoffs of $38.50 and
$1.00, for an expected value of $4.75. Thus results in a difference between the expected values,
in this case $11.65 (= $16.40 - $4.75). As one proceeds down the payoff matrix, the expected
value of both lotteries increases. The expected value of lottery B becomes greater than the
expected value of lottery A after the fourth decision row. Version Y inverts the row order,
leaving the same expected values intact, so that Decision Row 1 in X is now Decision Row 10 in
Y. Having both versions of the risk aversion instrument will allow for testing of order effects.

Testing for Joy of Winning and Optimism
Following the design of Holt and Sherman (1994) (HS) I implemented a modified
takeover experiment with varying parameters that allow for the three curse treatments in a
bidding game: the winner’s curse, loser’s curse, and a “no curse state”. These parameters are
given in Table 6. Using these three curse treatments I tested for a ‘joy of winning’ and for
judgmental errors possibly stemming from over-optimism in our entrepreneurial treatment group.
A ‘joy of winning’ would be revealed if in the “no curse state” there is a residual tendency for
entrepreneurs to overbid. Judgmental errors possibly stemming from over-optimism could be

14

Please refer to Appendix C for the 2 different versions of the paired menu choices given to subjects, version X
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ascertained either in the loser’s or winner’s curse portion of the experiment.15 The errors arise
when bids are closer to the naïve prediction. This would mean that in the winner’s curse naïve
bids would be greater than rational bids, and in the loser’s curse naïve bids were less than rations
bids. To recap, I use the bidding instrument, given in Appendix C, to test for ‘joy of winning’
and judgmental errors possibly stemming from over-optimism that could be present in
entrepreneurs.
My design is modified from HS in the following ways: (i) it was a one-shot game; (ii) the
initial endowment of wealth was drawn from a card deck ranging between $5 and $15 with
quarter increments (5.00, 5.25,..., 14.75, 15.00); (iii) the order of the curses was randomized in
the bidding task, allowing for four variations of the curse treatments; (iv) the parameters X and R
were different; and (v) entrepreneurs were used in a field setting.
The subjects were directed to read the bidding decision task as one of the attendants read
it to them aloud. We informed the subjects that they were being given an opportunity to bid for
the chance of getting an additional sum, in addition to the $10 participation fee. In this task the
subject placed a bid, up to a specified amount, that their bid would be greater than or equal to a
random monetary value drawn from a card deck within a known interval. If their bid was greater
than or equal to the value drawn from the deck they would win an amount of money.16 In the
event of a win, the payout is defined as 1.5 multiplied by the value of the card drawn, less their

(top to bottom) and version Y (bottom to top).
15
Recall that the winner’s curse can result from either a ‘joy of winning’ or the bidder ignores information
asymmetry and bids naively.
16
Conceptually think of the card game “War”. In this card game two persons each holding half a deck of cards
(from the same deck), face down, draw the top card from their respected half decks, and the person that shows the
highest valued card wins, ace being the highest. In the event of a tie a ‘war’ is declared. For our purposes, a tie goes
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initial bid. Since it was possible to make a loss in this task the subject was given an initial
endowment of wealth. This was accomplished by pulling a card from a deck ranging between $5
and $15 demarcated in quarter increments. In the event that negative profits were earned from
this task the payment would be subtracted from this initial endowment.
Next the procedures for the bidding tasks were explained. Here they had a chance of
getting an additional sum of money by placing three separate bids on three separate intervals of
cards. The bids could be any number in even quarters, as long as it was not so large that it would
lead to a loss for sure. Maximum bids were provided for each interval. These intervals
represented cash amounts between $3.50 and $10.50, $4 and $15, and $3 and $6; again all
intervals were demarcated in quarter increments and had a corresponding card deck. After the
bids were placed for each interval one interval was later selected at random to play out. The
subject would win the additional sum of money if their bid was greater than or equal to a random
pull of the card associated with that range. The bidding task was given to each subject only
once. Each interval used to bid corresponded to one of the curse treatments: winner’s curse,
loser’s curse, and the ‘no curse’ treatment.
The interval $3.50 to $10.50 was the “no curse treatment”, $4 to $15 was the winner’s
curse, and $3 to $6 the loser’s curse. This is where our study varied considerably from HS in
two distinct areas. First recall that HS used two variations of the curse treatment presentations to
the subjects, no-curse/winner’s curse/loser’s curse and a no-curse/loser’s curse/winner’s curse. It
was discussed previously in Chapter Two that allowing the winner’s curse and the loser’s curse

to the subject. Our study doesn’t split a deck of cards, however allows the subjects to place a bid, bounded between
ranges that will not let them lose for sure, and in the event that their bid is higher than a random value, they win.
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to vary at random from subject to subject controls for order effects between these two separate
bidding tasks. However, HS used the no-curse bidding task first in both cases, thus possibly
confounding results. Following Harrison, Johnson, McInnes, and Rutström (2004) I alternated
the order of the curse treatments allowing for four variations of the bidding task; a nocurse/winner’s curse/loser’s curse, loser’s curse/winner’s curse/no-curse, no-curse/loser’s
curse/winner’s curse, and winner’s curse/loser’s curse/no-curse treatments. By randomly
varying the curse treatments’ order I am able to test for possible order effects that could
otherwise cloud the results.
Next recall the parameters X and R that were originally used in the HS study (p.646)
were chosen “…so that the earnings reduction for naïve bidding was the same in both of these
treatments [winner’s curse and loser’s curse]. This comparable effect of departures from
rationality on earnings is desirable for a study of bidding biases, since the extent of the bias may
be affected by the cost of the non-optimal behavior. Choosing parameters to balance earnings in
this manner requires that the bidding biases differ between the winner’s curse and loser’s curse
treatments.” Simply put, using Table 4 we see that the difference for a naïve bidder between the
winner’s curse and the no curse treatment is $0.04 and the difference for a naïve bidder between
the no curse treatment and loser’s curse is again $0.04. HS argue that these symmetric cost
departures are optimal for controlling bidding biases that could result in bid differences between
these treatments. This point is well taken; however, if we focus our attention on the predicted
rational and naïve bids for the winner’s and loser’s curses we see that the cost departure in the
winner’s curse between the expected rational and naïve bid is a difference of $0.56, while in the
loser’s curse this difference is only $0.19. It may be more prudent to align the symmetries of the
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cost departures between the expected rational and naïve bids for the winner’s and loser’s curses
compared with the no curse treatment, letting expected gain fall where it may. Looking at Table
6 for our model we see that the cost departure for the expected rational bid compared to the
expected naïve bid is $1.13 for the winner’s curse and $1.12 for the loser’s curse, thus allowing
us to focus on bidding behavior in a more robust manner.

Procedures
The field data was collected at the bi-annual national Small Business Innovation
Research (SBIR) conference hosted in Atlanta, Georgia in April, 2004. The SBIR program is a
federally funded competitive program that provides grants to small business entrepreneurs who
want to work with governmental agencies to provide needed technologies. Attached to the SBIR
convention is the Small Business Tech Expo (SBTE) in which we secured a booth in the exhibit
area in order to run the experiments. Appendix A contains the SBIR public announcement
designed to attract entrepreneurs as well as a more thorough description of the SBIR program.
Our booth was set along side the Atlanta SBTE exhibitors section of the SBIR conference
with a banner reading “Research Study: Cash for Participation”.

The booth was run for a single

day by two University of Central Florida Professors, Julie Elston and Elisabet Rutström, and me.
In order to present a ‘professional’ image, everyone wore black pants with matching black and
gold polo shirts that sported embroidery of the university’s logo. University of Central Florida
business cards were also available at the table.
As individuals were drawn in by our banner or word of mouth, one of the three booth
attendants would approach the potential participants and explain that we were conducting a study
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of economic decision making, taking around 15 minutes to complete, and suggesting that if they
participated they would receive $10 for their participation with the possibility of earning even
more. A general written description of the research study was also given to the potential
participant at that time (see Appendix C). If the participant expressed interest in the study they
were given an Informed Consent Form that detailed their rights as a subject. They needed to sign
this form in order to proceed with the tasks. Once the consent form was signed, the participant
was issued a packet of instruments for the entire experiment, with each packet corresponding to a
unique identification number. The packet was given inside a folder and the participants were
instructed not to proceed between tasks without notifying one of the three attendants. These two
steps provided some measure of privacy to the participants when they were recording responses
and helped ensure that they proceeded in the task order that was given to them. A copy of the
instructions can be found in Appendix C.
The experiment was broken down into three parts. Part I was a socio-demographic
survey of individuals and their firm, should they own one. In Parts II and III the subjects were
presented with two decisions tasks: either a paired lottery choice MPL or a bidding instrument.
The order, in which the subjects received these tasks, and how they were presented, were
randomized to allow for testing of order effects. After completing parts I through III in their
entirety the subject would see how the two decision tasks played out, receive the participation fee
and any other accumulated earnings, sign a receipt acknowledging acceptance of their winnings,
and finally provide an e-mail address should they want a summary of our findings.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS
Recall that the hypotheses tested in this paper are: (i) entrepreneurs are less risk averse
than non-entrepreneurs; (ii) entrepreneurs will experience a ‘joy of winning’ compared to nonentrepreneurs; and (iii) entrepreneurs will suffer from judgmental bias, possibly in the form of
over-optimism, more than non-entrepreneurs.

Socio-Demographic
Data was collected from 62 individuals that had chosen to participate in the study, with
33 (53%) classified as individuals with some form of entrepreneurial experience and 29 (47%) as
individuals that were non-entrepreneurs. The classifications were results of the information that
was provided on the form “Questions About You and Your Firm” in Part I of the study. For
example, the 33 participants that were categorized with some form of entrepreneurial experience
had indicated that they were self-employed and provided information on an entrepreneurial firm
or they indicated employment either full or part-time in another firm, along with information on
an entrepreneurial firm as well.17 Non-entrepreneurs had indicated that they were either full or
part-time employment in another firm and did not provided information relating to an
entrepreneurial firm. For this study I use entrepreneurs as the treatment group and the nonentrepreneurs as the control group.

17

At the beginning of the study it became apparent that many individuals held positions in both self-employment
and employment in another firm. Our questionnaire was not set up to handle these individuals. For purposes of our
study, these individuals are all considered entrepreneurs. In many cases the participant had written their line of
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The demographic characteristics of these two groups differ. Entrepreneurs are more
likely to be Asian or of Asian decent (16% vs. 4%), more likely to obtain a post-graduate degree
at college (59% vs. 52%), less likely to have a higher household income (47% vs. 61%)18,
despite being around the same age (42 years vs. 43 years).

Risk Aversion
Table 2 displays the CRRA intervals that are used to classify our subjects’ elicited lottery
responses into relative risk intervals. The subject’s first switch from the ‘safe’ lottery to the
‘riskier’ lottery is used to define the lower bound of their CRRA interval. The upper bound of
the subject’s CRRA interval is calculated in the same manner; however, it uses the first instance
the subject chose the ‘riskier’ lottery.19 The subject’s mid-point of their CRRA is symmetrically
located between the upper and lower bounds. For example, an individual that chose 5 ‘safe’
choices followed by 5 ‘riskier’ choices would imply a CRRA somewhere between 0.15 and 0.41,
with a mid-point of 0.28 (one-half above the lower bound and one-half below the upper bound).
This method for assessing risk attitudes has the advantage that the only assumption being made
is that of constant relative risk aversion.20 However, the disadvantage is that some of the
subject’s responses are lost due to censoring. Censoring occurs when the individual’s CRRA

employment on the questionnaire making identification easier. However, in all instances a coherent story needed to
be constructed in order for some confidence in the classification.
18

Household income in excess of $100,000 for year 2003 was used to differentiate for ‘high income’ households.
Anderson, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2004) discuss the use of iterative MPL (iMPL) formats that narrow the
interval of CRRA, thus allow for a more precise measurement of CRRA.
20
Holt and Laury (2002) state that CRRA provides an adequate measure of subject behavior for low payout
treatments. Our study uses a 10x scaling of their “baseline” treatment, which is below their higher payout ranges.
19
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interval includes at least one or both bounds are expressed as ± ∞ . To illustrate this example,
imagine an individual that is extremely risk averse. They would choose 9 ‘safe’ choices in the
lottery, only switching to the ‘riskier’ option when it is a sure thing. Their implied lower bound
of CRRA is 1.37 and the upper bound is + ∞ , clearly a mid-point cannot be specified and
therefore these individuals were excluded.21
Figure 1 in Appendix B shows the elicited interval mid-points for the entrepreneur and
non-entrepreneur groups. There is one main conclusion that can be drawn by looking at this
figure. A comparison between the entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs clearly shows that the
entrepreneur group has a mode that is more risk loving than the mode of the non-entrepreneur
group. This would imply that entrepreneurs are less risk averse than their non-entrepreneurial
counterparts. We also observe heterogeneity in the sample of elicited measures of risk aversion
for the entrepreneur group. This may be attributed to how I originally defined the entrepreneur.
Recall that the definition of entrepreneurs aggregated individuals that were both self-employed
entrepreneurs and still held a job along with individuals that were solely self-employed. This
definition could account for the wide range of risk attitudes seen in the entrepreneur group.
Where an argument could be made that an individual that still held a job while also selfemployed would be viewed as an individual that is not willing to accept the full risk of selfemployment; and thus account for the more risk averse observations that we see in Figure 1.
Whether or not this is the case Figure 1 alerts us that there is heterogeneity in the sample of
entrepreneurs that will need to be accounted for in later statistical tests.

21

This is present in 8 of our subjects, thus the n = 54 (62-8=54) in Figure 1.
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Figure 2 is a graphical representation of Table 7. Both use an interval regression model
to estimate risk attitudes of entrepreneurs correcting for heteroskedasticity. The advantage of the
interval regression approach is that censoring only occurs if an individual’s CRRA interval
includes both bounds expressed as ± ∞ ; this effectively removed the 8 observations that were
previously censored.22 However, a disadvantage of the interval regression approach is that if
subject’s demographic information is missing the complete observation is dropped.23
Table 7, the interval regression output, uses the non-entrepreneur group as the control
group. I test for average effects, after controlling for heteroskedasticity, for the following
dummy variables: entrepreneurs, the order in which the task was presented (risk instrument or
bidding instrument first), the order of the bidding instrument (version X or Y), age, gender, race,
higher education, marital status, and higher income. Looking first at the constant we see a value
of 0.971, which is interpreted as the CRRA for the control group of non-entrepreneurs, before
controlling for the other explanatory variables in the model. From Table 2 we find that a CRRA
value of 0.971 would imply that on average the control group makes 8 ‘safe’ choices before
switching to the ‘riskier’ lottery. Next we see that the coefficient for entrepreneurs is -0.336,
implying that the entrepreneur group has an average CRRA equal to 0.635 (0.971 - 0.336 =
0.635). A CRRA value of 0.635 implies, on average, that the group of entrepreneurs will make 6
‘safe’ choices before switching to the ‘riskier’ lottery. This finding confirms the conclusion that
the entrepreneur group is less risk averse than the non-entrepreneur group, and we can reject the

22

Table 7 uses an n = 53. This is due to ‘goofy’ observations, such as subjects that had multiple switch points or
subjects that did not provide all their demographic information (3 subjects).
23
This is the case for figure 2 with n = 59, the n is reflective of the 3 subjects that failed to provide ALL
demographic information. Therefore they are censored.
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hypothesis that entrepreneurs exhibit the same amount of CRRA compared to the control group
of non-entrepreneurs at the 1% significance level (p-value 0.002).

Joy of Winning
Holt and Sherman (1994) speculated that the winner’s curse could be the product of two
separate forces: (i) a bidder is naïve and ignores information asymmetry; and (ii) the subject
experiences a pure joy of winning, which increases the possibility that overbidding, is due to a
‘joy of winning’. If there is a ‘joy of winning’ it would be shown by a residual tendency to
overbid in the ‘no curse’ treatment.
Figure 3 displays observed bids for the three treatments across all subjects. The vertical
lines in each treatment show the risk neutral bids for rational and naïve bidders (calculated in
Table 6). Looking at the bid pattern for the ‘no curse’ treatment we see tremendous variance in
the bidding behavior across all subjects. However, this figure plots bids under the assumption of
risk neutrality. We know from previous findings that there is a statistically significant difference
in CRRA between our two groups. Therefore, controlling for these differences must be dealt
with first before looking at any ‘joy of winning’ behavior. The individual subjects’ mid-point
from their elicited CRRA, implied from the risk aversion task, is used to control for these
differences.
Figure 4 shows the effect of risk aversion on bidding behavior. Taking the ‘no curse’
treatment for example, if a subject had a CRRA of 1.17 it would imply that their predicted bid
would be $11.93, almost $5.00 above the risk neutral bid prediction of $7.00. Likewise, a
subject that had a CRRA of -0.32 would have a predicted bid of $6.51, almost $0.50 below the
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risk neutral bid prediction. This figure clearly shows why risk attitudes should be accounted for
when testing for any ‘joy of winning’ behavior.
Each subject provided 3 bids (one for each curse treatment) and an implied risk aversion
measure (from the lottery choice experiment). To test for a ‘joy of winning’ I compare the
percentage differences between the actual bid provided by each subject for the ‘no curse’
treatment against their predicted bid given their individual elicited CRRA mid-point value.
Evidence for a ‘joy of winning’ would be shown if this percentage difference is positive and
statistically significant.
Table 8 displays this percentage difference for various model specifications. Panel A
shows the average percentage difference of bids for the pooled sample of the entrepreneur and
non-entrepreneur groups. The actual bid exceeded the predicted bid by a little more than 23
percent in the ‘no curse’ treatment. To test for a ‘joy of winning’ we need to show that the
exceeded difference of 23 percent is statistically significant and greater than the null hypothesis
that it is equal to the predicted rational bid. To do so, I set my null hypothesis that the ratio of
actual bids to predicted bids is equal to 1, while the alternate hypothesis contends that the ratio is
something greater than 1. Therefore the use of a right-tailed t-test is employed to test these
competing hypotheses. The t-test statistic is found as 3.6610 (p-value 0.0003), thus accepting the
alternate hypothesis that the ratio is something greater than 1. This finding implies that the
pooled groups had experienced a residual tendency to overbid in the ‘no curse’ treatment, thus
supporting an initial claim of a ‘joy of winning’. Panels B and C also test for the occurrence of
a ‘joy of winning’ in the same manner; however, each panel isolates our subjects to their
respected groups. Panel B shows the average percentage difference of bids for the non-
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entrepreneur group. Their actual bid exceeded their predicted bid by about 15 percent in the ‘no
curse’ treatment. This finding is also positive and statistically significant around the 5 percent
level (p-value 0.0534). Panel C shows the average percentage difference of bids for the
entrepreneur group. Their actual bid exceeded their predicted bid by about 30 percent in the ‘no
curse’ treatment. This finding is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level (pvalue 0.0007).
Further, Table 9 tests whether the overbidding by non-entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs
differed by a statistically significant amount. If this can be shown it would provide evidence that
non-entrepreneurs exhibit a lower ‘joy of winning’ than entrepreneurs. Otherwise stated, the
non-entrepreneur group did overbid, but by not as much as the entrepreneur group. This is tested
by obtaining the difference between the means of the two groups and testing if that difference is
equal to zero. I find that the difference between the two means is not statistically significant (pvalue 0.2508), thus lending no support the claim that the bidding behavior is different between
the two groups.
To restate, I find initial evidence of a ‘joy of winning’ when both groups are pooled
together. This result still holds even after controlling for the event that the subject is either an
entrepreneur or non-entrepreneur. Thus there is evidence to support the claim that both
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs exhibit a ‘joy of winning’, and that the size of the effect is
larger for entrepreneurs.
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Optimism
Judgmental error, possibly stemming from over-optimism, can be tested for in the
winner’s and loser’s curse treatments. These errors would occur if the subjects’ bidding
behavior is closer to the predicted naïve level than the predicted rational level. I use the subject’s
actual bid and divide it by the predicted rational bid conditioned on the individual’s elicited
CRRA value, and whether or not the individual experienced a ‘joy of winning’ to develop a ratio
in both the loser’s and winner’s curse treatments. With these ratios we can test whether bidding
behavior is indeed rational. In other words, I use the elicited CRRA for the subject to calculate
their predicted rational bid, and then scale this prediction up by their elicited ‘joy of winning’
from their ‘no curse’ responses. I then take the ratio of their observed bid in the winner’s and
loser’s curse treatments to their predicted bid.
Table 10 shows deviations from rational bid predictions controlling for CRRA and any
‘joy of winning’ for the individuals in the winner’s curse treatment. Panel A shows that actual
bids for all subjects, both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, exceeded the predicted rational
bid by little more than 5 percent. To support evidence of judgmental errors for the combined
groups a t-test must show that actual bids being 5 percent higher is significantly different from
the predicted rational bid. This finding is not statistically significant at any conventional
confidence level (p-value 0.4584). Panel B focuses on the subset of non-entrepreneurs. We see
that they exceeded the predicted rational bid by almost 10 percent; however, this result is not
statistically significant either (p-value 0.4311). Panel C performs this test for the entrepreneur
group. The entrepreneurs exceeded their predicted rational bid by about 2 percent; this also is
not statistically significant (p-value 0.8407).
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Further, Table 11 tests whether the ratio of actual bids to predicted rational bids,
accounting for individual CRRA and any ‘joy of winning’, made by the non-entrepreneurs and
entrepreneurs differed between their groups by a statistically significant amount in the winner’s
curse treatment. If this difference were found to be statistically significant it could provide
evidence that one of the groups experienced greater judgmental errors than the other. However, I
find that the difference between the two means is not statistically significant (p-value 0.2508),
thus lending no support the claim that there is a difference in judgmental errors between the two
groups.

Table 12 shows these deviations from the predicted rational bid for the loser’s curse
treatment. Panel A shows that actual bids for both groups combined were higher than the
predicted rational bid by almost 25 percent. Here we see initial evidence of judgmental errors by
accepting the alternative hypothesis that the mean for the pooled groups is statistically different
from the predicted rational bids at a confidence level of 6.5 percent. This provides us with an
initial measure of judgmental errors before accounting for the occurrence that the individual is
either a non-entrepreneur or entrepreneur. Panel B focuses on the subset of non-entrepreneurs.
We see that they exceeded the predicted rational bid by little more than 22 percent; however, this
result is not statistically different from the predicted rational bid (p-value 0.2836). Panel C
performs this test for the entrepreneur group. The entrepreneurs exceeded their predicted
rational bid by almost 27 percent; this also is not statistically different from the predicted rational
bid at a conventional level of confidence (p-value 0.1317). Lastly, Table 13 tests whether the
ratio of actual bids to predicted rational bids made by both groups differed by a statistically
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significant amount in the loser’s curse treatment. Again, I find that the difference between the
two means is not statistically significant (p-value 0.2508), thus lending no further support to the
claim that there is a difference in judgmental errors between the two groups.
In summary, no evidence of judgmental errors was found in the winner’s curse treatment,
however, evidence of judgmental errors was initially shown in the loser’s curse treatment when
all subjects were pooled together. This result disappeared after individually testing both the
entrepreneur and non-entrepreneur groups separately. There is little evidence to claim that
entrepreneurs suffer from judgmental errors more than non-entrepreneurs. 24

24

All tests were also performed using the ratio of actual subject bids to the predicted naïve bid, again controlling for
individual CRRA and any ‘joy of winning’ effects. Findings from these tests do not support any conclusions
contrary to what has been presented using the predicted rational bids.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
This thesis was motivated by evidence that there may be restrictions imposed on the
supply of entrepreneurs. This evidence came from an international study that found, for
industrialized countries, many individuals who are currently employed in another firm state that
they actually prefer to be self-employed. However, examining self employment data for the
U.S., Great Britain, and Germany we see that there is a large disparity between the percentages
of individuals who are actually self-employed and those that had indicated they wished to be
self-employed. These differences raised the question: Why don’t more of these individuals
actually become self-employed?
Looking for an answer I turned to entrepreneurial literatures from the areas of
psychology, management, and economics. Earlier attempts were made by the social sciences to
characterize and define what makes an entrepreneur distinct by interviewing those individuals
that had self-selected into becoming an entrepreneur, and then looking for causal relationships in
their socio-demographic profile that could account for their chosen role. These sociodemographic elicitations resulted in many assumptions about entrepreneurs. These assumptions
seemed to indicate a risk loving attitude and over-optimism in entrepreneurs as compared to nonentrepreneurs. However, until assumptions are explicitly tested, they are just assumptions. I
wanted to test if there was an underlying difference in risk preferences and optimism between
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs that could possibly explain why certain individuals select
into self-employment while others do not. This was implemented by using experimental
methods to provide testable hypotheses in order to systematically evaluate the existing theories
on entrepreneurial behavior.
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The use of lottery choice and bidding experiments, performed on entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs in the field, allowed me to directly elicit measures of risk attitudes, a ‘joy of
winning’, and judgmental bias possibly stemming from over-optimism for the entrepreneur. It
was shown that entrepreneurs are generally more risk loving than a non-entrepreneur control
group. Further, there is evidence to support the claim that entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs
both exhibit a ‘joy of winning’, and that the size of the effect is slightly larger for entrepreneurs.
However, there is little evidence to conclude that entrepreneurs suffer from judgmental errors
more than non-entrepreneurs.
These findings show that one restriction in the supply of entrepreneurs may be inherent in
how much risk they are willing to subject themselves to. The Oxford Dictionary states it best,
defining “risk” as “The chance that is accepted in economic enterprise and considered the
source of (an entrepreneur’s) profit.” Here we see that those who selected into the role of an
entrepreneur were indeed largely those individuals with a more risk loving attitude.
Extensions of this research include testing entrepreneurs in other countries to find if these
results hold across cultures. Another extension would be to test for differences in risk attitudes
between different subsets of entrepreneurs; recall that this study focused on high-technology
entrepreneurs. It would be wise to account for a broader sample to see if the implication for risk
aversion is the same in other areas of entrepreneurial activity.

43

APPENDIX: A

44

SBIR – Public Announcement
The National SBIR/STTR Conference and Small Business Tech Expo (SBTE)
Technology Connections: Funding, Strategies, and Partnerships
April 26-29, 2004 Hilton Atlanta Hotel Atlanta, GA
This year, the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology
Transfer (STTR) program will provide $2 billion to small businesses through federal programs to help entrepreneurs
take their ideas from conception to reality. This conference gives you the tools you need to obtain part of the $2
billion available to small business innovators.
CONFERENCE TOPICS INCLUDE:
• SBIR/STTR 101: An Overview of the SBIR and STTR Programs
• Federal Agency Overviews
• The Do’s and Dont’s of Proposal Writing
• Writing a Cost Proposal
• Identifying Your Market Opportunities
• Increasing Your Chances with SBIR/STTR
• Partners (STTR): University & Federal Labs
• Partners: Utilizing Incubators
• Leveraging & Protecting Your Intellectual Property
• Managing SBIR/STTR Projects – The Basics
• What the Agencies Look For & How They Do It
• Phase III Government Contracts – What’s Relevant Now?
• Exploring Alternative Financing Programs
• Accessing the Other 97% Federal R&D Funding
• Corporate Alliances – Overview
NETWORKING OPPORTUNITIES
This conference provides each participant with multiple opportunities to meet and network with SBIR and
STTR Program Managers, and fellow attendees, including SBIR/STTR award winners, speakers, and experts from
businesses and the government willing to work with you to move your business ahead.
Extra Bonus: Conference participation guarantees entry into the co-located Small Business Tech Expo
(SBTE) sponsored in part by NASA. The expo will showcase new technologies, support services available to small
business and technology development, and commercialization opportunities. For more details and exhibiting
opportunities visit: www.barayevents.com/sbte
FEDERAL AGENCIES PARTICIPATING IN THE SBIR/STTR PROGRAMS
Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of Education,
Department of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department
of Transportation, Environmental Protection Agency, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National
Science Foundation.
If you think that your small business could benefit from more than $2 billion in government grants and
contracts, this is the opportunity you can’t afford to miss.
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SBIR - Overview
The SBIR program began in 1983 as a way to channel government R&D funds to, as
legislation defines it; American owned and independently operated for profit small business with
no more than 500 employees, a principal researcher employed by the business and a product that
appears to have commercial potential. The funds used in the program are from ten government
agencies with additional R&D obligations over $100 million and they are required to set aside a
certain percentage of their funds, 2.5 percent since 1997, to small business R&D. The ten
agencies that contribute money to the program include the Departments of: Commerce, Health
and Human Services, Defense, Education, Agriculture, Energy, and Transportation, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the
National Science Foundation. Every year each of these government agencies publishes a list of
R&D topics that will merit funding and review individual proposals from small business based
on those specified topics.
Selection for the SBIR grant is based on small business qualification, degree of innovation,
technical merit, and future potential in the market. When a proposal is accepted by an agency
the small business will potentially go through 3 phases of the SBIR program: Phase I is a limited
effort startup phase that determines feasibility and scientific and technical merit of an idea. This
phase has been restricted by legislation to ideas “that appear to have commercial potential.” The
amount that can be awarded in Phase I is $100,000 and is usually for six months. Phase II
awards can be applied for by winners of Phase I only. Small businesses that win this award go
into detailed R&D, usually resulting with a prototype product or process. Emphasis on
commercial potential is also increased. The amount that can be awarded in Phase II is $750,000
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and usually lasts about two years. Phase III involves private sector investment and support for
introducing the new product or process into the market place. Small businesses conduct Phase
III with non-SBIR funds to pursue commercial applications of the R&D funded in Phases I and II
for the private or public market, if intended for use by the federal government.
A small business is allowed to receive one Phase I and/or II per year per project; therefore, it
is possible for a single company to be awarded multiple awards in one year for different projects
and likewise over time as well. Please see www.sbirworld.com for a more detailed approach of
the SBIR program.
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Table 1
The Ten Paired Lottery-Choice Decisions with "Baseline" Payoffs

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1

Option A
$2.00
0.9
$2.00
0.8
$2.00
0.7
$2.00
0.6
$2.00
0.5
$2.00
0.4
$2.00
0.3
$2.00
0.2
$2.00
0.1
$2.00
0

$1.60
$1.60
$1.60
$1.60
$1.60
$1.60
$1.60
$1.60
$1.60
$1.60

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1

Option B
$3.85
0.9
$3.85
0.8
$3.85
0.7
$3.85
0.6
$3.85
0.5
$3.85
0.4
$3.85
0.3
$3.85
0.2
$3.85
0.1
$3.85
0

$0.10
$0.10
$0.10
$0.10
$0.10
$0.10
$0.10
$0.10
$0.10
$0.10
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EVA
$1.64
$1.68
$1.72
$1.76
$1.80
$1.84
$1.88
$1.92
$1.96
$2.00

EVB
$0.48
$0.85
$1.23
$1.60
$1.98
$2.35
$2.73
$3.10
$3.48
$3.85

Expected Payoff
Difference
$1.17
$0.83
$0.50
$0.16
-$0.18
-$0.51
-$0.85
-$1.18
-$1.52
-$1.85

Table 2
Risk Aversion Classifications Based on Lottery Choices
Number
Range of
of
Relative Risk Aversion
Safe Choices
for U(x) = x1-r/(1-r)
0-1
r < -0.95
2
-0.95 < r < -0.49
3
-0.49 < r < -0.15
4
-0.15 < r < 0.15
5
0.15 < r < 0.41
6
0.41< r < 0.68
7
0.68 < r < 0.97
8
0.97 < r < 1.37
9-10
1.37 < r
Source: Holt and Laury. Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects, pg. 10

Risk Preference
Classification
highly risk loving
very risk loving
risk loving
risk neutral
slightly risk averse
risk averse
very risk averse
highly risk averse
stay in bed
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Table 3
Probability

Implied Lower Bound Calculation for 'Risk Neutral' Subject
Payoffs of Safe Option A

Payoffs of Riskier Option B

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1

$2.00
$2.00
$2.00
$2.00
$2.00
$2.00
$2.00
$2.00
$2.00
$2.00

$1.60
$1.60
$1.60
$1.60
$1.60
$1.60
$1.60
$1.60
$1.60
$1.60

$3.85
$3.85
$3.85
$3.85
$3.85
$3.85
$3.85
$3.85
$3.85
$3.85

r

EUsafe

EUrisk

EUdiff

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

1.64
1.68
1.72
1.76
1.80
1.84
1.88
1.92
1.96
2.00

0.48
0.85
1.23
1.60
1.98
2.35
2.73
3.10
3.48
3.85

1.17
0.83
0.50
0.16
-0.18
-0.51
-0.85
-1.18
-1.52
-1.85

r

EUsafe

EUrisk

EUdiff

-0.1426
-0.1426
-0.1426
-0.1426
-0.1426
-0.1426
-0.1426
-0.1426
-0.1426
-0.1426

1.54
1.58
1.63
1.67
1.71
1.76
1.80
1.85
1.89
1.93

0.47
0.87
1.27
1.67
2.07
2.48
2.88
3.28
3.68
4.08

1.08
0.72
0.36
0.00
-0.36
-0.72
-1.08
-1.43
-1.79
-2.15

*HL report this as -0.15
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$0.10
$0.10
$0.10
$0.10
$0.10
$0.10
$0.10
$0.10
$0.10
$0.10

Table 4
HS Model Parameters, Bids, and Expected Gains
Parameters
Treatment
Winner's curse
No curse
Loser's curse

X
1.50
1.00
0.50

R
4.50
2.00
0.50

Bids
M
1.50
1.50
1.50
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BR
3.00
2.00
1.00

Expected gains (doubled)
BN
3.56
2.00
0.81

BR
0.250
0.250
0.250

BN
0.215
0.250
0.215

Table 5
Version X: Ten Paired Lottery-Choice Decisions

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1

Option A
$20.00
0.9
$20.00
0.8
$20.00
0.7
$20.00
0.6
$20.00
0.5
$20.00
0.4
$20.00
0.3
$20.00
0.2
$20.00
0.1
$20.00
0

$16.00
$16.00
$16.00
$16.00
$16.00
$16.00
$16.00
$16.00
$16.00
$16.00

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1

Option B
$38.50
0.9
$38.50
0.8
$38.50
0.7
$38.50
0.6
$38.50
0.5
$38.50
0.4
$38.50
0.3
$38.50
0.2
$38.50
0.1
$38.50
0

$1.00
$1.00
$1.00
$1.00
$1.00
$1.00
$1.00
$1.00
$1.00
$1.00
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EVA
$16.40
$16.80
$17.20
$17.60
$18.00
$18.40
$18.80
$19.20
$19.60
$20.00

EVB
$4.75
$8.50
$12.25
$16.00
$19.75
$23.50
$27.25
$31.00
$34.75
$38.50

Expected Payoff
Difference
$11.65
$8.30
$4.95
$1.60
-$1.75
-$5.10
-$8.45
-$11.80
-$15.15
-$18.50

Table 6
Model Parameters, Bids, and expected gains
Parameters
Treatment
Winner's curse
No curse
Loser's curse

X
4.00
3.50
3.00

R
11.00
7.00
3.00

Bids
M
1.50
1.50
1.50
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BR
8.00
7.00
6.00

Expected gains
BN
9.13
7.00
4.88

BR
0.727
0.875
1.500

BN
0.670
0.875
1.289

Figure 1

Elicited Risk Attitudes of Entrepreneurs
Mid-Point of Directly Elicited CRRA Interval
Elicited Over Prizes Between $1.00 and $38.50
Entrepreneurs (N=29)
Frequency

15

Risk Loving

Risk Averse

10
5
0
-1

-.5

0

.5

1

1.5

Frequency

Non-Entrepreneurs (N=25)
10
8

Risk Loving

Risk Averse

6
4
2
0
-1

-.5

0

.5

1
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1.5

Table 7
Stata Output for Estimated Risk Attitudes of Entrepreneurs
. intreg crraLO crraHI EntrepreneurE $treatR $rhs if odd==0 & georgia==1, het(EntrepreneurE
Number of obs
Wald chi2(11)
Prob > chi2
Interval regression
Log pseudolikelihood
model
Entrepreneur
Endowment
OrderTask
OrderRow
Age
Female
Black
Asian
HigherEd
Married
HighInc
_cons
lnsigma
Entrepreneur
Endowment
OrderTask
OrderRow
_cons

$treatR) robust
=
53
=
42.93
=
0
=
-83.977

Coefficient

Robust Std.

z

P>lzl

-0.3365
0.0271
0.0616
-0.0170
-0.0237
-0.1229
0.1298
0.4309
0.1468
0.0631
0.1530

0.111
0.013
0.145
0.134
0.005
0.122
0.093
0.435
0.090
0.100
0.123

-3.03
2.03
0.43
-0.13
-4.65
-1.01
1.40
0.99
1.63
0.63
1.24

0.002
0.420
0.670
0.899
0.000
0.315
0.162
0.322
0.104
0.528
0.214

-0.5538
0.0009
-0.2221
-0.2790
-0.0337
-0.3624
-0.5212
-0.4224
-0.0302
-0.1328
-0.0880

-0.1191
0.0532
0.3453
0.2450
-0.0137
0.1167
0.3117
1.2842
0.3239
0.2589
0.3940

0.9715

0.211

4.61

0.000

0.5588

1.3841

0.7199
-0.0037
0.8061
0.6721
-2.0557

0.410
0.050
0.379
0.289
0.670

1.76
-0.07
2.13
2.32
-3.07

0.079
0.641
0.034
0.020
0.002

-0.0835
-0.1011
0.0629
0.1054
-3.3686

1.5234
0.0937
1.5494
1.2387
-0.7428

[95% Confidence Interval]

Legend: Unless otherwise stated, all variables are binary dummy variables in which 1 denotes true and 0 denotes
false. "Entrepreneur" indicates the subjects that indicated current ownership and operation of an
entrepreneurial firm; "OrderTask" indicates if the risk aversion task came second; "OrderRow" indicates if the
rows in the risk aversion task were the (vertically) reverse of those shown in Table 1; "Age" is a non-binary
variable indicating the age in years; "Female" indicates females; "Black" indicates a reported black racialethnic category; "Asian" indicates a reported Asian racial-ethnic category; "HigherEd" indicates if the subject
has completed some post-graduate education; "married" indicates if the subject is currently married; "HighInc"
indicates subjects with household incomes, for 2003, over $100,000.
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Figure 2

Estimated Risk Attitudes of Entrepreneurs
Predicted CRRA from Statistical Model
Elicited Over Prizes Between $1.00 and $38.50
Entrepreneurs (N=31)
Frequency

15

Risk Loving

Risk Averse
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-1
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0
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1

1.5

Non-Entrepreneurs (N=28)
Frequency

15

Risk Loving

Risk Averse

10
5
0
-1

-.5

0

.5

1
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1.5

Figure 3

Observed Bids
Vertical lines are risk-neutral bid predictions
Winner's Curse
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.1
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0
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0
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Figure 4

Effect of Risk Aversion on Bids
Winner's Curse

Bid
($)

No Curse

Loser's Curse

15

15

15

10

10

10

Naive

Rational
Rational

5

5
-1

-.5

0
.5
CRRA

1

1.5

5
-1

-.5

0
.5
CRRA

1

1.5
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Naive

-1

-.5

0
.5
CRRA

1

1.5

Table 8
No Curse ~ Percentage Difference Between Actual Bid and Predicted Bid Accounting for Individual CRRA

Variable

Observation
61

joy
Degress of Freedom: 60

Panel A: Both Groups
Mean
1.2329

Std. Error
0.0636

Std. Dev.
0.4969

[95 % Conf. Interval]
1.1057
1.3602

Ho: mean(joy) = 1
Ha: mean < 1
t = 3.6610
P < t = 0.9997

Ha: mean = 1
t = 3.6610
P > l t l = 0.0005

Variable

Observation
29

joy
Degress of Freedom: 28

Ha: mean > 1
t = 3.6610
P > t = 0.0003

Panel B: Non-Entrepreneur Group
Mean
Std. Error
1.1555
0.0933

Std. Dev.
0.5026

[95 % Conf. Interval]
0.9644
1.3467

Ho: mean(joy) = 1
Ha: mean < 1
t = 1.6664
P < t = 0.9466

Ha: mean = 1
t = 1.6664
P > l t l = 0.1068

Variable

Observation
32

joy
Degress of Freedom: 31

Ha: mean > 1
t = 1.6664
P > t = 0.0534

Panel C: Entrepreneur Group
Mean
Std. Error
1.3031
0.0864

Std. Dev.
0.4890

Ho: mean(joy) = 1
Ha: mean < 1
t = 3.5062
P < t = 0.9993

Ha: mean = 1
t = 3.5062
P > l t l = 0.0014
* Where

Ha: mean > 1
t = 3.5062
P > t = 0.0007

Ho: refers to the null hypothesis
Ha: refers to the alternate hypothesis

60

[95 % Conf. Interval]
1.1268
1.4794

Table 9
No Curse ~ Percentage Difference Between Actual Bid and Predicted Bid Accounting for Individual CRRA and Group

Group
Observation
Mean
Std. Error
0 (non-entrepreneurs)
29
1.1555
0.0933
1 (entrepreneurs)
32
1.3031
0.0864
combined
61
1.2329
0.0636
difference
-0.1476
0.1272
Satterhwaite's Degress of Freedom: 58.0567
Ho: mean (0) - mean (1) = difference = 0
Ha: difference < 0
t = -1.1600
P < t = 0.1254
* Where

Ha: difference = 0
t = -1.1600
P > l t l = 0.2508

Std. Dev.
0.5026
0.4890
0.4969

Ha: difference > 0
t = -1.1600
P > t = 0.8746

Ho: refers to the null hypothesis
Ha: refers to the alternate hypothesis

61

[95 % Conf.
Interval]
0.9644
1.3467
1.1268
1.4794
1.1057
1.3602
-0.4022
0.1071

Table 10
Winner's Curse ~ Deviations from Predicted Bids Expressed as a Percentage Accounting for Individual CRRA and ‘Joy’

Variable

Observation
60

bratio
Degress of Freedom: 59

Panel A: Both Groups
Mean
1.0537

Std. Error
0.07192

Std. Dev.
0.55701

[95 % Conf. Interval]
0.9098
1.1976

Ho: mean(bratio) = 1
Ha: mean < 1
t = 0.7463
P < t = 0.7708

Ha: mean = 1
t = 0.7463
P > l t l = 0.4584

Variable

Observation
28

bratio
Degress of Freedom: 27

Ha: mean > 1
t = 0.7463
P > t = 0.2292

Panel B: Non-Entrepreneur Group
Mean
Std. Error
1.0947
0.1186

Std. Dev.
0.6273

[95 % Conf. Interval]
0.8515
1.3380

Ho: mean(bratio) = 1
Ha: mean < 1
t = 0.7992
P < t = 0.7844

Ha: mean = 1
t = 0.7992
P > l t l = 0.4311

Variable

Observation
32

bratio
Degress of Freedom: 31

Panel C: Entrepreneur Group
Mean
1.0177

Ha: mean > 1
t = 0.7992
P > t = 0.2156

Std. Error
0.0875

Std. Dev.
0.4950

Ho: mean(bratio) = 1
Ha: mean < 1
t = .2026
P < t = 0.5796

Ha: mean = 1
t = .2026
P > l t l = 0.8407
* Where

Ho: refers to the null hypothesis
Ha: refers to the alternate hypothesis
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Ha: mean > 1
t = .2026
P > t = 0.4204

[95 % Conf. Interval]
0.8393
1.1962

Table 11
Winner's Curse ~ Deviations from Predicted Rational Bid Accounting for Group, CRRA, and 'Joy'

Group
Observation
Mean
Std. Error
0 (non-entrepreneurs)
28
1.0947
0.1186
1 (entrepreneurs)
32
1.0177
0.0875
combined
60
1.0537
0.0719
difference
0.0770
0.1473
Satterhwaite's Degress of Freedom: 51.1996
Ho: mean (0) - mean (1) = difference = 0
Ha: difference < 0
t = 0.5227
P < t = 0.6983
* Where

Ha: difference = 0
t = 0.5227
P > l t l = 0.6034

Std. Dev.
0.6273
0.4950
0.5571

Ha: difference > 0
t = 0.5227
P > t = 0.3017

Ho: refers to the null hypothesis
Ha: refers to the alternate hypothesis
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[95 % Conf.
Interval]
0.8515
1.3380
0.8393
1.1962
0.9098
1.1976
-0.2188 0.3728

Table 12
Loser's Curse ~ Deviations from Predicted Bids Expressed as a Percentage Accounting for Individual CRRA and ‘Joy’

Variable

Observation
60

bratio
Degress of Freedom: 59

Panel A: Both Groups
Mean
1.2477

Std. Error
0.1318

Std. Dev.
1.0212

[95 % Conf. Interval]
0.9841
1.5117

Ho: mean(bratio) = 1
Ha: mean < 1
t = 1.8805
P < t = 0.9675

Ha: mean = 1
t = 1.8805
P > l t l = 0.0650

Variable

Observation
28

bratio
Degress of Freedom: 27

Ha: mean > 1
t = 1.8805
P > t = 0.0325

Panel B: Non-Entrepreneur Group
Mean
Std. Error
1.2228
0.2036

Std. Dev.
1.0775

[95 % Conf. Interval]
0.8050
1.6406

Ho: mean(bratio) = 1
Ha: mean < 1
t = 1.0940
P < t = 0.8582

Ha: mean = 1
t = 1.0940
P > l t l = 0.2836

Variable

Observation
32

bratio
Degress of Freedom: 31

Panel C: Entrepreneur Group
Mean
1.2699

Ha: mean > 1
t = 1.0940
P > t = 0.1418

Std. Error
0.1743

Std. Dev.
0.9862

Ho: mean(bratio) = 1
Ha: mean < 1
t = 1.5483
P < t = 0.9341

Ha: mean = 1
t = 1.5483
P > l t l = 0.1317
* Where

Ho: refers to the null hypothesis
Ha: refers to the alternate hypothesis
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Ha: mean > 1
t = 1.5483
P > t = 0.0659

[95 % Conf. Interval]
0.9144
1.6255

Table 13
Loser's Curse ~ Deviations from Predicted Rational Bid Accounting for Group, CRRA, and 'Joy'

Group
Observation
Mean
Std. Error
0 (non-entrepreneurs)
28
1.2228
0.2036
1 (entrepreneurs)
32
1.2699
0.1743
combined
60
1.2479
0.1318
difference
-0.0471
0.2681
Satterhwaite's Degress of Freedom: 55.2388
Ho: mean (0) - mean (1) = difference = 0
Ha: difference < 0
t = -0.1759
P < t = 0.4305
* Where

Ha: difference = 0
t = -0.1759
P > l t l = 0.8610

Std. Dev.
1.0775
0.9862
1.0212

Ha: difference > 0
t = -0.1759
P > t = 0.5695

Ho: refers to the null hypothesis
Ha: refers to the alternate hypothesis
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[95 % Conf.
Interval]
0.8050
1.6406
0.9144
1.6255
0.9841
1.5117
-0.5843 0.4900

APPENDIX: C
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WELCOME TO THE RESEARCH STUDY
DESCRIPTION

This is a study of economic decision making. We think you will find it interesting, you
will be paid $10 for your participation and you could earn additional money. How much
you earn will depend partly on chance and partly on the choice you make in decision
problems which you will be presented with. The instructions are simple and you will
benefit from following them carefully.
The problems are not designed to test you. What we want to know is what choices you
would make in them. The only right answer is what you really would choose. That is
why the problems give you the chance of earning real money. You will be paid in cash as
soon as you finish the task.

The task will proceed in three short parts.

The first part consists of a few questions about your firm and you. This
information is for research use only. The published results of our research will not
identify any firm or individual, or the choice he or she made in any way. Nor will we
give this identifying information to anyone else.
The second and third part are short decision problems in which chance may play a
part. Each decision-problem requires you to make a choice. This is described in more
detail when you have completed the first part. Both of these parts may result in additional
earnings over and above the $10 participation fee.
We expect the entire task to take less than 15 minutes.
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ID: _______

Part 1: Some Questions About You and Your Firm

In this survey most of the questions asked are descriptive. We will not be grading your answers
and your responses are completely confidential. We will not be recording your name or the name of your
firm on this sheet. Please think carefully about each question and give your best answers.
Questions About Your Firm
1.

How old is your firm, in years? ____________

2.

What type of product or service do you provide? _____________________________

3.

Have you ever experienced a shortage of capital in running your firm? (Circle one number)
01
02
03
04
05

4.

Do you have a shortage of capital now?
01

5.

Yes

No

Inheritance
Gift
Credit cards
Earnings from another job

05
06
07

SBIR grant
Private loan from a bank or person
Other

Have you ever applied for or received an SBIR grant?
Applied:
Received:

8.

02

How did you primarily finance your firm’s start up? (Circle all that apply)
01
02
03
04

6.

Never
Rarely
Occasionally
Often
Always

01
01

Yes
Yes

02
02

No
No

How do you finance your firm now? Enter rough percentages for each:
01
02
03
04
05
06
07

Government loans or grants
Private loans from banks or people
Credit cards
Earnings from another job
Cash from operations
Equity capital
Other

__________
__________
__________
__________
__________
__________
__________

9.

What would you estimate to be the annual revenue of your firm? _________________

10.

What would you estimate to be the value of the assets of your firm? _________________

11.

What is the state and ZIP code of the main location of your firm? ____________________
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Questions About You
1.

What is your AGE? ____________ years

2.

What is your sex? (Circle one number.)
01
Male
02
Female

3.

Which of the following categories best describes you? (Circle one number.)
01
White
06
Hispanic-American
02
African-American
07
Hispanic
03
African
08
Mixed Race
04
Asian-American
09
Other
05
Asian

4.

What is your current employment status, and that of your spouse or domestic partner?
(Circle one number for each)

You
01
02
03
04
05
5.

Self-employed only
Part-time employment in another firm
Full-time employment in another firm
Actively seeking employment
Unemployed

Less than high school
GED or High School Equivalency
High school

04
05
06

Vocational or trade school
Bachelor’s degree at college
Higher degree at college

03
04

Separated or divorced?
Widowed?

Are you currently...
01
02

7.

01
02
03
04
05

What is the highest level of education you have completed? (Circle one number)
01
02
03

6.

Your spouse or
domestic partner

Single and never married?
Married?

How many people live in your household? Include yourself, your spouse and any dependents. Do not
include your parents or roommates unless you claim them as dependents.
___________________

8.

Please circle the category below that describes the total amount of INCOME earned in 2003 by the people
in your household (as “household” is defined in the previous question). [Consider all forms of income,
including salaries, tips, interest and dividend payments, scholarship support, student loans, parental
support, social security, alimony, and child support, and others.]
01
02
03
04
05

$25,000 or under
$25,001 - $45,000
$45,001 - $65,000
$65,001 - $85,000
$85,001 - $100,000

06
07
08
09
10
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$100,001 - $125,000
$125,001 - $150,000
$150,001 - $175,000
$175,001 - $200,000
over $200,000

XRW

Decision Task

Your decision sheet shows ten decisions listed on the left. Each decision is a paired
choice between “Option A” and “Option B.” You will make a choice on each row and record
these in the final column.
Here is a ten-sided die that will be used to determine payoffs. The faces are numbered
from 0 to 9, and we will use the 0 face of the die to serve as 10. Look at Decision 1 at the top.
Option A pays $20.00 if the throw of the ten sided die is 1, and it pays $16.00 if the throw is 210. Option B yields $38.50 if the throw of the die is 1, and it pays $1.00 if the throw is 2-10.
The other Decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the chances of
the higher payoff for each option increase. In fact, for Decision 10 in the bottom row, the die will
not be needed since each option pays the highest payoff for sure, so your choice here is between
$20.00 or $38.50.
After you have made all of your choices, you will throw this die twice, once to select one
of the ten decisions to be used, and a second time to determine what your payoff is for the option
you chose, A or B, for the particular decision selected. Even though you will make ten decisions,
only one of these will end up affecting your earnings, but you will not know in advance which
decision will be used.
We will not perform the dice roll until after you have completed the next short task.
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Decision Task

Your decision sheet shows ten decisions listed on the left. Each decision is a paired
choice between “Option A” and “Option B.” You will make a choice on each row and record
these in the final column.
Here is a ten-sided die that will be used to determine payoffs. The faces are numbered
from 0 to 9, and we will use the 0 face of the die to serve as 10. Look at Decision 1 at the top.
Option A pays $20.00 if the throw of the ten sided die is 1, and it pays $16.00 if the throw is 210. Option B yields $38.50 if the throw of the die is 1, and it pays $1.00 if the throw is 2-10.
The other Decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the chances of
the higher payoff for each option increase. In fact, for Decision 10 in the bottom row, the die will
not be needed since each option pays the highest payoff for sure, so your choice here is between
$20.00 or $38.50.
After you have made all of your choices, you will throw this die twice, once to select one
of the ten decisions to be used, and a second time to determine what your payoff is for the option
you chose, A or B, for the particular decision selected. Even though you will make ten decisions,
only one of these will end up affecting your earnings, but you will not know in advance which
decision will be used.
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Your Choice
(Circle A or B)

Decision

Option A

Option B

1

$20.00 if throw of die is 1
$16.00 if throw of die is 2-10

$38.50 if throw of die is 1
$1.00 if throw of die is 2-10

A

B

$20.00 if throw of die is 1-2
$16.00 if throw of die is 3-10

$38.50 if throw of die is 1-2
$1.00 if throw of die is 3-10

A

B

$20.00 if throw of die is 1-3
$16.00 if throw of die is 4-10

$38.50 if throw of die is 1-3
$1.00 if throw of die is 4-10

A

B

$20.00 if throw of die is 1-4
$16.00 if throw of die is 5-10

$38.50 if throw of die is 1-4
$1.00 if throw of die is 5-10

A

B

$20.00 if throw of die is 1-5
$16.00 if throw of die is 6-10

$38.50 if throw of die is 1-5
$1.00 if throw of die is 6-10

A

B

$20.00 if throw of die is 1-6
$16.00 if throw of die is 7-10

$38.50 if throw of die is 1-6
$1.00 if throw of die is 7-10

A

B

$20.00 if throw of die is 1-7
$16.00 if throw of die is 8-10

$38.50 if throw of die is 1-7
$1.00 if throw of die is 8-10

A

B

$20.00 if throw of die is 1-8
$16.00 if throw of die is 9-10

$38.50 if throw of die is 1-8
$1.00 if throw of die is 9-10

A

B

$20.00 if throw of die is 1-9
$16.00 if throw of die is 10

$38.50 if throw of die is 1-9
$1.00 if throw of die is 10

A

B

$20.00 if throw of die is 1-10

$38.50 if throw of die is 10

A

B

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

DECISION ROW CHOSEN BY FIRST THROW OF THE DIE: _________

THROW OF THE DIE TO DETERMINE PAYMENT: ____________

EARNINGS: ________________
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Decision Task

Your decision sheet shows ten decisions listed on the left. Each decision is a paired
choice between “Option A” and “Option B.” You will make a choice on each row and record
these in the final column.
Here is a ten-sided die that will be used to determine payoffs. The faces are numbered
from 0 to 9, and we will use the 0 face of the die to serve as 10. Look at Decision 10 at the
bottom. Option A pays $20.00 if the throw of the ten sided die is 1, and it pays $16.00 if the
throw is 2-10. Option B yields $38.50 if the throw of the die is 1, and it pays $1.00 if the throw is
2-10.
The other Decisions are similar, except that as you move up the table, the chances of the
higher payoff for each option increase. In fact, for Decision 1 in the top row, the die will not be
needed since each option pays the highest payoff for sure, so your choice here is between $20.00
or $38.50.
After you have made all of your choices, you will throw this die twice, once to select one
of the ten decisions to be used, and a second time to determine what your payoff is for the option
you chose, A or B, for the particular decision selected. Even though you will make ten decisions,
only one of these will end up affecting your earnings, but you will not know in advance which
decision will be used.
We will not perform the dice roll until after you have completed the next short task.
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Decision Task

Your decision sheet shows ten decisions listed on the left. Each decision is a paired
choice between “Option A” and “Option B.” You will make a choice on each row and record
these in the final column.
Here is a ten-sided die that will be used to determine payoffs. The faces are numbered
from 0 to 9, and we will use the 0 face of the die to serve as 10. Look at Decision 10 at the
bottom. Option A pays $20.00 if the throw of the ten sided die is 1, and it pays $16.00 if the
throw is 2-10. Option B yields $38.50 if the throw of the die is 1, and it pays $1.00 if the throw is
2-10.
The other Decisions are similar, except that as you move up the table, the chances of the
higher payoff for each option increase. In fact, for Decision 1 in the top row, the die will not be
needed since each option pays the highest payoff for sure, so your choice here is between $20.00
or $38.50.
After you have made all of your choices, you will throw this die twice, once to select one
of the ten decisions to be used, and a second time to determine what your payoff is for the option
you chose, A or B, for the particular decision selected. Even though you will make ten decisions,
only one of these will end up affecting your earnings, but you will not know in advance which
decision will be used.
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Decision

Option A

Option B

Your Choice
(Circle A or B)

1

$20.00 if throw of die is 1-10

$38.50 if throw of die is 1-10

A

B

2

$20.00 if throw of die is 1-9
$16.00 if throw of die is 10

$38.50 if throw of die is 1-9
$1.00 if throw of die is 10

A

B

3

$20.00 if throw of die is 1-8
$16.00 if throw of die is 9-10

$38.50 if throw of die is 1-8
$1.00 if throw of die is 9-10

A

B

4

$20.00 if throw of die is 1-7
$16.00 if throw of die is 8-10

$38.50 if throw of die is 1-7
$1.00 if throw of die is 8-10

A

B

5

$20.00 if throw of die is 1-6
$16.00 if throw of die is 7-10

$38.50 if throw of die is 1-6
$1.00 if throw of die is 7-10

A

B

6

$20.00 if throw of die is 1-5
$16.00 if throw of die is 6-10

$38.50 if throw of die is 1-5
$1.00 if throw of die is 6-10

A

B

7

$20.00 if throw of die is 1-4
$16.00 if throw of die is 5-10

$38.50 if throw of die is 1-4
$1.00 if throw of die is 5-10

A

B

8

$20.00 if throw of die is 1-3
$16.00 if throw of die is 4-10

$38.50 if throw of die is 1-3
$1.00 if throw of die is 4-10

A

B

9

$20.00 if throw of die is 1-2
$16.00 if throw of die is 3-10

$38.50 if throw of die is 1-2
$1.00 if throw of die is 3-10

A

B

10

$20.00 if throw of die is 1
$16.00 if throw of die is 2-10

$38.50 if throw of die is 1
$1.00 if throw of die is 2-10

A

B

DECISION ROW CHOSEN BY FIRST THROW OF THE DIE:________

THROW OF THE DIE TO DETERMINE PAYMENT: ____________

EARNINGS: ________________

75

ID: WLR _________ Decision Task

In this task you will have the opportunity to bid for the chance of getting an additional
sum of money. Your bid can be any number in even quarters as long as it is not so large that it
will lead to a loss for sure. We will tell you what that maximum is.
You will draw a card from this deck to determine a value. If the value is less than your
bid you will get the extra money. The money you get will be equal to 1.5 times the value, but we
will then subtract your bid from that.
You will be given three opportunities to bid, but we will only select one for payment at
the end. This will be done randomly. Since it is possible to make a loss, we will give you a sum
of money up front in addition to your earnings. This will be an amount between $5 and $15 and
you will draw a card to determine that now.
Any loss will be subtracted out of this sum, but you will be paid the remainder. If you do
not make a loss you will be paid both your earnings and this sum of money. The three
opportunities differ in the range of values that can be drawn from the deck of cards:
•

The first time the value will be drawn between $3.50 and $10.50. This will be done using
the deck of cards.

•

The second time the value will be drawn between $4 and $15.

•

The third time the value will be drawn between $3 and $6.

Additional amount of money: ____________________
Please write down your three bids here:
Bid1: _____________ (maximum bid is $15.75)
Bid 2: _____________ (maximum bid is $22.50)
Bid 3: _____________ (maximum bid is $9)
We will fill in the remainder after you have drawn the cards. First we will go on to the other
short task.
Value 1:

Bid1 > Value1?

[1.5 H Value1] - Bid1 =

Value 2:

Bid2 > Value2?

[1.5 H Value2] - Bid2 =

Value 3:

Bid3 > Value3?

[1.5 H Value3] - Bid3 =
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Decision Task

In this task you will have the opportunity to bid for the chance of getting an additional
sum of money. Your bid can be any number in even quarters as long as it is not so large that it
will lead to a loss for sure. We will tell you what that maximum is.
You will draw a card from this deck to determine a value. If the value is less than your
bid you will get the extra money. The money you get will be equal to 1.5 times the value, but we
will then subtract your bid from that.
You will be given three opportunities to bid, but we will only select one for payment at
the end. This will be done randomly. Since it is possible to make a loss, we will give you a sum
of money up front in addition to your earnings. This will be an amount between $5 and $15 and
you will draw a card to determine that now.
Any loss will be subtracted out of this sum, but you will be paid the remainder. If you do
not make a loss you will be paid both your earnings and this sum of money. The three
opportunities differ in the range of values that can be drawn from the deck of cards:
•

The first time the value will be drawn between $3.50 and $10.50. This will be done using
the deck of cards.

•

The second time the value will be drawn between $4 and $15.

•

The third time the value will be drawn between $3 and $6.

Additional amount of money: ____________________
Please write down your three bids here:
Bid1: _____________ (maximum bid is $15.75)
Bid 2: _____________ (maximum bid is $22.50)
Bid 3: _____________ (maximum bid is $9)
We will fill in the remainder after you have drawn the cards.
Value 1:

Bid1 > Value1?

[1.5 H Value1] - Bid1 =

Value 2:

Bid2 > Value2?

[1.5 H Value2] - Bid2 =

Value 3:

Bid3 > Value3?

[1.5 H Value3] - Bid3 =
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ID: RLW _________

Decision Task

In this task you will have the opportunity to bid for the chance of getting an additional
sum of money. Your bid can be any number in even quarters as long as it is not so large that it
will lead to a loss for sure. We will tell you what that maximum is.
You will draw a card from this deck to determine a value. If the value is less than your
bid you will get the extra money. The money you get will be equal to 1.5 times the value, but we
will then subtract your bid from that.
You will be given three opportunities to bid, but we will only select one for payment at
the end. This will be done randomly. Since it is possible to make a loss, we will give you a sum
of money up front in addition to your earnings. This will be an amount between $5 and $15 and
you will draw a card to determine that now.
Any loss will be subtracted out of this sum, but you will be paid the remainder. If you do
not make a loss you will be paid both your earnings and this sum of money. The three
opportunities differ in the range of values that can be drawn from the deck of cards:
•

The first time the value will be drawn between $3.50 and $10.50. This will be done using
the deck of cards.

•

The second time the value will be drawn between $3 and $6.

•

The third time the value will be drawn between $4 and $15.

Additional amount of money: ____________________
Please write down your three bids here:
Bid1: _____________ (maximum bid is $15.75)
Bid 2: _____________ (maximum bid is $9)
Bid 3: _____________ (maximum bid is $22.50)
We will fill in the remainder after you have drawn the cards.
Value 1:

Bid1 > Value1?

[1.5 H Value1] - Bid1 =

Value 2:

Bid2 > Value2?

[1.5 H Value2] - Bid2 =

Value 3:

Bid3 > Value3?

[1.5 H Value3] - Bid3 =
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ID: LWR _________

Decision Task

In this task you will have the opportunity to bid for the chance of getting an additional
sum of money. Your bid can be any number in even quarters as long as it is not so large that it
will lead to a loss for sure. We will tell you what that maximum is.
You will draw a card from this deck to determine a value. If the value is less than your
bid you will get the extra money. The money you get will be equal to 1.5 times the value, but we
will then subtract your bid from that.
You will be given three opportunities to bid, but we will only select one for payment at
the end. This will be done randomly. Since it is possible to make a loss, we will give you a sum
of money up front in addition to your earnings. This will be an amount between $5 and $15 and
you will draw a card to determine that now.
Any loss will be subtracted out of this sum, but you will be paid the remainder. If you do
not make a loss you will be paid both your earnings and this sum of money. The three
opportunities differ in the range of values that can be drawn from the deck of cards:
•

The first time the value will be drawn between $3.50 and $10.50. This will be done using
the deck of cards.

•

The second time the value will be drawn between $3 and $6.

•

The third time the value will be drawn between $4 and $15.

Additional amount of money: ____________________
Please write down your three bids here:
Bid1: _____________ (maximum bid is $15.75)
Bid 2: _____________ (maximum bid is $9)
Bid 3: _____________ (maximum bid is $22.50)
We will fill in the remainder after you have drawn the cards. First we will go on to the other
short task.
Value 1:

Bid1 > Value1?

[1.5 H Value1] - Bid1 =

Value 2:

Bid2 > Value2?

[1.5 H Value2] - Bid2 =

Value 3:

Bid3 > Value3?

[1.5 H Value3] - Bid3 =
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Request for information on the survey and experiments – VOLUNTARY

If you would like to receive a copy of a brief summary of the survey and our experiments,
please provide your name and contact information below. We will not be using this information
for any other purpose than to send you the summary. If you do not want to receive this
information, then do not write anything. Note that we will not connect your name with the ID
you used for the responses you gave us.

NAME:

____________________________________________________

ADDRESS:

____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________

E-MAIL:

____________________________________________________

FAX:

____________________________________________________
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